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Abstract 
The use of violence in the IsraellPalestine conflict has been justified and legitimised 
by an appeal to religion. Militant Islamist organisations like Ramas have become 
central players in the Palestinian political landscape as a result of the popular support 
that they enjoy. This thesis aims to investigate the reasons for this support by 
analysing the IsraellPalestine conflict in terms of Ruman Needs Theory. 
According to this Theory, humans have essential needs that need to be fulfilled in 
order to ensure survival and development. Among these needs, the need for identity 
and recognition of identity is of vital importance. This thesis thus explores the concept 
of identity as a need, and investigates this need as it relates to inter-group conflict. 
In situating this theory in the IsraellPalestine conflict, the study exammes how 
organisations like Ramas have Islamised Palestinian national identity in order to 
garner political support. The central contention, then, is that the primary identity 
group of the Palestinian population is no longer nationalist, but Islamic/nationalist. 
In Islamising the conflict with Israel as well as Palestinian identity, Ramas has been 
able to justify its often indiscriminate use of violence by appealing to religion. The 
conflict is thus perceived to be one between two absolutes - that of Islam versus 
Judaism. 
In considering the conflict as one of identities struggling for survival in a climate of 
perceived threat, any attempt at resolution of the conflict needs to include a focus on 
needs-based issues. The problem-solving approach to negotiation allows for parties to 
ii 
consider issues of identity, recognition and security needs, and thus ensures that the 
root causes of conflicts are addressed, The contention is that this approach is vital to 
any conflict resolution strategy where identity needs are at stake, and it provides the 
grounding for the success of more traditional zero-sum bargaining methods. 
A recognition of Islamic identity in negotiation processes in IsraellPalestine may thus 
make for a more comprehensive conflict resolution strategy, and make the outcomes 
of negotiations more acceptable to the people of Palestine, thus undermining the 
acceptance of violence that exists at present. 
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Preface 
The nature of the topic of this thesis required in-depth and relatively recent research 
of the Israel/Palestine conflict. Due to the fact that I was located at Rhodes University, 
Grahamstown for the duration of the writing of this thesis, I had to make use of 
reading material and resources available to me, and compile an analysis of the conflict 
from these materials . 
While the Internet is not regarded as an ideal resource for academic research, the 
nature of my enquiry dictated that I find information beyond that offered in the 
libraries available to me. The Internet references used in this thesis all come from 
credible sources and constitute sound academic research, and were used in cases 
where journal articles or books failed to provide me with the information that I 
required. 
These sources, together with the academic journal articles and books, enabled me to 
put the IsraellPalestine conflict in perspective, analyse it, and make inferences with 
regard to the importance of reconceptualising conflict resolution in this particular 
context. 
Many thanks to my supervisors, Dr Gary Baines of the Rhodes University History 
Department and Professor Peter Vale of the Rhodes University Political and 
International Studies Department. The time and effort that they spent discussing my 
thesis with me, offering criticisms and keeping me focused is greatly appreciated. 
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Introduction 
The IsraeVPalestine conflict has generally been considered in a religious light - in the 
Palestinian perspective, as a struggle of Muslims against an enemy that occupied 
Islamic land and dispossessed Muslim people, and in the Israeli perspective, as a fight 
against anti-Semitism and the protection of an historical Jewish territory (Humphries: 
2001: 196). While the conflict is perceived to be rooted in biblical history, it is a 
struggle not only of religious difference, but also over land, resources, sovereignty, 
and most importantly, the survival of groups who perceive their ethnic and cultural 
identity to be under threat (Humphries: 2001: 46 - 48). The central protagonists - the 
Jewish Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs - both feel resentment over past injury and 
are unwilling to agree to a settlement that might undermine their security. The shared 
sense of victimisation by the Israelis and Palestinians, both political and 
psychological, is crucial as it provides a driving force in the conflict. In addition, 
neither is in a position to impose its will on the other over the long term, partiCUlarly 
as the actions ofradical groups have increased the polarisation of the conflict. 
The rise of radical religious nationalism within both groups has led to an increase in 
violence, where this violence continues to undermine the peace process. While the 
Jewish religious right has been influential in preventing settlement of the conflict, this 
thesis aims to explore how the actions of Islamist l movements like the Islamic 
Resistance Movement' have affected the conflict and attempts to settle it by 
mobilising Islamic identity. 
While Muslim militants place the roots of the IsraeVPalestine conflict in the distant 
[ I use the term "Islamism" rather than "fundamentalism" due to the fact that "fundamentalism" is 
rooted in a specific Protestant experience, premised on the fact that the Bible is the true word of God 
and should be understood literally. It makes no sense to speak of this in terms of Islam where the 
Qur'an is considered to be the literal word of God, and is understood as such. More importantly, 
"'fundamentalism' suggests the restoration of a pure, unsullied, and authentic form of the religion" 
where, in fact, these movements rather seek to revitalise and re-Islamise modem Muslim societies 
(Beinin & Stork: 1997: 3). 
2 The Islamic Resistance, formed by the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine in 1987, is otherwise known 
as Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiyya, or its acronym, Hamas, which means "zeal" (Litvak: 
http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-Iitvak.htm). 
past, citing the confrontation between Muhammad and the Jews of Medina as the first 
manifestation of this conflict in order to highlight the innate hostility between the two 
groups, the conflict, in fact, only dates back to the twentieth century (Humphries: 
2001 : 46). Similarly, Hauss (2001: 135 - 136) argues that while both the Jewish 
Israelis and the Palestinian Arabs have powerful claims to the same territory, and 
while that land is home to both Islamic and Jewish sacred religious sites, the conflict 
is largely a product of twentieth-century political choices. 
The Jewish population of Palestine numbered only about 8 per cent of the total 
population of the region in the early 1900s, but anti-Semitism in Europe brought the 
realisation that there was no future for Jews as a minority in Europe, and that a Jewish 
future was most likely to be secured in Palestine, the traditional homeland of the Jews 
(Hauss: 2001: 136; Humphries: 2001: 49). This idea of a Jewish National Home in 
Palestine was formally propagated by the 1917 Balfour Declaration - perceived on all 
sides to be an endorsement of a Jewish state - and the 1922 League of Nations 
Mandate for Palestine. As the flight of Jews to Palestine increased in the 1930s and 
1940s, Palestinians came to resent the new settlers on "their" land, and general strikes 
and an open revolt against British rule took place in the region (Hauss: 2001: 137). 
The Peel Commission, established by Britain, investigated the situation and, in 1937, 
reported that as the Jews and Palestinians were unlikely to work out their differences, 
partition of the region, and the creation of a small Jewish state seemed the most viable 
solution (Hauss: 2001: 137). On the 29 th of November 1947 the UN General 
Assembly passed Resolution 181, calling for the creation of a Jewish state, a 
resolution that the Palestinians and other Arab states were adamantly opposed to. The 
State ofIsrael was proclaimed on the 14th of May 1948, and with this, the Palestinians 
not only lost control over most of their territory, but at least 800 000, or over 80 
percent of the Palestinian popUlation fled, while others fell under control of the new 
state ofIsrael (Hauss: 2001: 139). 
Nationalism in the Middle East resulted from attempts by political movements to 
attain power (Halliday: 2000: 40), and arose as the dominant ideology in the Middle 
East as early as the 1930s, where national liberation movements attempted to end 
foreign domination of their territories (Salame: 1995: 28). The popUlarity of 
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nationalism peaked in the 1950s and 1960s during the era of Gamal 'Abd-al Nasir, the 
Algerian revolution and Ba'thist rule in Syria and Iraq (Gelvin: 1999: 72). The 
economic and political shortcomings of secular nationalism, together with the rise of 
conservative Gulf monarchies and the failure of unity schemes of a United Arab 
Republic proved the nationalism espoused by these movements to be empty and 
superficial. This led to disillusionment with the movement and provided the 
opportunity for the rise in popUlarity and influence of movements like the Muslim 
Brotherhood' in Egypt. 
The waning of political support for secular nationalism in the Middle East can be 
attributed to various factors, the first of which is the fact that secular nationalism is 
considered to be a Western ideal that was not only imposed on former colonies, but 
also resulted in the erosion of traditional cultures and values (Juergensmeyer: 1993: 
19 - 20). Further, secular nationalist movements are not only considered to be 
responsible for moral decline in their communities, but are also held accountable for 
their failure to perform in terms of promises of political freedom, economic prosperity 
and social justice (Juergensmeyer: 1993: 21). Secular nationalism failed to meet the 
hopes and expectations of the people it represented. In the fifties and sixties, the hopes 
of people in the Arab world hinged on ideas of socialism and pan-Arab nationalism, 
but the failure of these sparked a return to older and more familiar concepts (Ayubi: 
1991: 65). 
Despite the initial mobilisation of support based on nationalism, the waning of respect 
for secular nationalist movements has provided Islamist movements with an ability to 
situate themselves as a viable alternative to these movements in the political and 
social arenas. Thus, in the Middle East, one finds a move away from secularism 
toward a growing concern with a cultural identity that is considered to be under threat 
(Halliday: 2000: 43). As such, popular disillusionment with nationalism in the Middle 
3 Founded by Hasan al-Banna in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood's original aims were moral as well as 
political. It sought to reform society by encouraging a return to Islam rather than by attempting to 
capture the state apparatus through direct political action. The Brotherhood became increasingly 
radicalised in the years following the Second World War, and formed Hamas in the Palestinian 
occupied territories at the beginning of the 1987 intifada (Ruthven: 1997: 124). 
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East has left an ideological vacuum that is being filled by Islamism (Gelvin: 1999: 
72). 
The incorporation of Islam into politics should not be understood as a revival of faith 
in the Middle East region, but rather as an assertion of the relevance of that belief, 
selectively applied to politics (Halliday: 2000: 132). The claim is thus that Islam 
should not only play a dominant role in politics and social life, but should also 
detennine the identity of Muslim groups. So, in attempting to gain and maintain 
control of the state, Islamist movements assert the claim of determining "a politics for 
Muslim peoples" (Halliday: 2000: 132). 
The growing support of Islamist movements within the region points to the fact that 
these movements provide a means of furthering the interests and values of a specific 
identity group. According to Humphries (2001: 197), it is reductionist to argue that 
the rise of Islamism is rooted solely in the socio-economic conditions of the region. 
After all, secular movements attack the same socio-economic and political problems 
that Islamist movements do. What, then, explains the support that these Islamist 
movements enjoy, and how have they come to replace secular nationalist movements 
in mobilising political support? 
It is the contention of this thesis that Palestinian Islamist movements like Hamas have 
surpassed nationalist movements in tenns of political support not only because of 
disillusionment with secular nationalism, but also because they have been able to 
mobilise the population of Palestine by making appeals to Islamic identity. 
Furthennore, while this identity is of great importance to the people of that region, it 
is an identity that has, largely, been overlooked in negotiation processes. This 
oversight has not only provided these groups with increased political credibility 
among the people of Palestine as they are not seen to harbour a conciliatory attitude 
towards Israel, but it has also hampered the successful implementation of peace 
initiatives in the region. 
As such, it is necessary to account for the importance of identity as a human need and 
situate it in group conflict. This thesis begins, then, with a discussion of human needs 
as they pertain to protracted social and political conflicts. While traditional methods 
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of conflict resolution focus on coercion and control through power mechanisms as a 
means of controlling conflict, Human Needs Theory posits that this merely targets the 
symptoms ofthe conflict rather than the cause (Azar: 1990: 145). 
Conflicts arise largely as a result of the denial of those human needs that are essential 
for human development and survival (Azar: 1990: 146). More importantly, conflicts 
often arise as a result of the denial of the human need for recognition of social 
identity. The first chapter, then, analyses the importance of identity for both 
individuals and groups. In addition, in examining Social Identity Theory, it shows not 
only that the formation of identity groups is necessarily competitive and 
discriminatory, but also that when the survival of an identity group is perceived to be 
under threat, conflict is likely to ensue. 
Due to the fact that mUltiple identities (for example, nationalist, Pan-Arab and Islamic 
identities) exist, in times of social or political upheaval, these multiple identities come 
to be expressed in terms of one dominant identity (Jabri: 1996: 119 - 120). In the 
current world context, nationalism provides an opportunity for individuals to evaluate 
themselves positively, thus making national groups valuable to identify with. 
However, because nations and national identities are constructed, identities are 
circumstantial, volatile and diverse (Gelvin: 1999: 73). Nationalism is thus "a site 
where different representations of the nation contest and negotiate with each other" 
(Duara in Gelvin: 1999: 74). As such, national identity is not static but is constantly 
changing, and religion may provide a unifying force in nationalism, where political 
support is mobilised by religious-nationalist groups not only in terms of protection of 
a given territory and people, but also in order to protect a given cultural system. The 
construction of identity by religious-nationalist groups, then, can alter the primary 
identity of a group of people by mobilising them in order to protect a traditional, 
religious identi ty. 
In terms of this, then, the second chapter of this thesis situates the analysis of identity 
and conflict in the IsraellPalestine conflict. While Palestinian nationalism has, in the 
past, been the primary identity group, Islamist movements have shifted the primary 
identity group in that region by conflating Islam and nationalism. 
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A contradiction appears to exist, though, between nationalist claims for an 
autonomous nation state, culture and identity, and the Islamic aim of uniting Muslim 
peoples, regardless of nationality or ethnicity. Because the goal of Islamist 
movements, of ordering society according to the dictates of Islam, can only be 
accomplished by capturing the levers of the state, these associations have been 
structured in a manner that coheres with the regional state system (Gelvin: 1999: 85). 
Furthermore, Islamist movements have accepted the existence of modem states, 
despite their once artificially drawn boundaries, and thus shape their agendas and 
goals to accord with national realities (Esposito: 1984: 293). Islamist movements have 
thus needed to reformulate their position in order to achieve equivalent support to 
nationalist claims, while upholding the basis of Islamic identity. So, while 
propagating a pan-Islamic ideal, most Islamist movements have had to include 
nationalist sentiments in their ideological platforms. Thus Ira Lapidus (in 
Juergensmeyer: 1993 : 47) states that "the capacity of Islam to symbolise social 
identity has been merged into national feeling." 
In Palestine, then, national identity has been Islamised by groups like Hamas through 
the means of embracing national symbols of Palestine and endowing these with 
Islamic meaning, thus turning the struggle for the sake of a Palestinian nation into an 
Islamic struggle for Palestine (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
Palestinian identity has been Islamised through imbuing national symbols with an 
Islamic essence, mythologising history, and sanctifying Palestine. 
The effect of this has been to give religious sanction to actions carried out by these 
groups. While Halliday (1995: 112, 118) notes that there is no necessary or historic 
link between the religion of Islam and terrorist acts, it appears that the rise of Islamist 
movements, and their invocation of religion as a justification for political actions, is 
indicative of particular social forces and issues present within their societies. In this 
sense, these actions may be considered to be either a response to social problems, or 
they may arise as a result of state intrusion or external domination. In addition, 
Halliday (2000: 134) argues that the invocation of Islam is contingent not only on the 
social and political context in which Islamist movements act, but also on the political 
goals that these movements aspire to. 
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Important for conflict resolution, then, is the recognition of the importance of human 
needs in generating and perpetuating conflict. The third chapter of this thesis 
examines the problem-solving or consultation approach to conflict resolution, where 
human needs provide the basis for the theory. 
Traditional conflict resolution theories consider substantive, conflict of interest issues 
is the root causes of conflict, and tend to consider negotiation to be a bargaining 
process where one party's loss is the other's gain. In contrast, the problem-solving 
approach recognises that conflicts are generally over subjective, or non-negotiable 
needs or values, and that, in reconceptualising conflict in this way, and in promoting a 
reconceptualisation of the conflict by the parties to the conflict, the means of 
resolving it are easier to attain. The problem-solving approach, then, may be used as a 
complement or a precursor to more traditional approaches as it makes substantive 
issues easier to resolve by facilitating communication between conflicting parties. The 
interactive nature of the problem-solving approach aims to assist parties in redefining 
their situations so that the conflict is perceived to be a shared predicament, thus 
placing an emphasis on constructive co-operation between the parties rather than on 
zero-sum bargaining. The problem-solving approach thus incorporates the aspect of 
human needs into the negotiation process in order to ensure that the root causes of the 
conflict are addressed. 
The Oslo Declaration of Principles between Israel and Palestine provided a reasonably 
accurate depiction of the workings of the problem-solving approach to negotiations. 
Yet, this peace programme has never been implemented successfully, largely due to 
the opposition that militant groups have levelled at it. In examining the failings of the 
Declaration of Principles, one conclusion that can be reached is that, in focussing on 
the economic needs of the people of Israel and Palestine, rather than on SUbjective 
issues like the Islamic Palestinian Identity, the Accords failed to find the support 
needed to make them effective. 
In conclusion, then, this thesis proposes to examine the viability of a more coherent 
conflict resolution strategy in Israel and Palestine - a strategy that not only takes 
cognisance of human needs and their place in conflict, but one that more fully 
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understands the social dynamics of the region, and thus includes a recognition of 
identity in the search for peace. 
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Chapter 1 
"There exist specific and relatively enduring human needs which individuals will 
inevitably strive to satisfY. even at the cost of personal disorientation and social 
disruption .. 
- Rosati, Carroll & Coate (1990: 156). 
According to human needs theorists, the interaction of individuals and groups striving 
for the satisfaction of basic human needs within specific contexts forms the 
foundation of politics (Rosati, Carroll & Coate: 1990: 156). The central proposition 
that these theorists hold is that behaviour is determined by the level at which needs are 
satisfied "as related to the relative priority placed on these needs," where human 
needs are considered to be necessary for the full realisation and development of 
individuals (Rosati, Carroll & Coate: 1990: 166). 
According to Azar (1990: 145), protracted social conflict IS characterised by 
economic and technological underdevelopment, unintegrated social and political 
systems, and distributive injustice. While it may seem that the only possibility of 
resolving these conflicts rests on the exercise of coercion or control through power 
mechanisms, this, in effect, is merely targeting the symptoms of the conflict rather 
than the root causes, and the conflict is thus likely to continue. 
Azar (1990: 146-147) suggests that while situations of protracted social conflict 
appear to be unique in terms of local circumstances, histories and attitudes, certain 
structural and behavioural characteristics are common to all such situations, and these 
pertain to the satisfaction of basic human needs. The sources of protracted social 
conflict are rooted deeply in the lives and ontological beings of those involved (Azar 
1990: 146). The root of social conflict is the denial of those elements required by all 
people and all societies for development; that is, the root of social conflict is the 
denial of needs - for security, social recognition of identity and effective participation 
- the pursuit of which is a compelling need in all. While it is difficult to detect, define 
or measure a sense of insecurity or other need deprivations, the ethnic and communal 
cleavages and political structures associated with them are easier to discern (Azar: 
1990: 146). Thus, ethnic cleavages are manifestations of the deprivation not just of 
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one need usually (the need for ethnic identity), but of many. Thus, in this view, the 
denial of human needs is the primary source of conflict domestically, communally and 
internationally, where human beings act in order to safeguard their needs, or to ensure 
satisfaction of needs of which they have been deprived. Social conflicts, then, develop 
from attempts to combat conditions of perceived victimisation in terms of the denial 
of identity in the political process, the absence of security of culture and valued 
relationships, and the absence of effective political participation in remedying this 
victimisation. 
This chapter proposes to investigate human needs as they pertain to conflict. The first 
section of this chapter will discuss human needs theory as a valuable analytical tool, 
as well as providing an examination of the rather nebulous concepts of needs, interests 
and values. The concept of identity as a need is examined in the second section of this 
chapter, where issues of self-esteem, social identity and group identity are discussed. 
The third section of this chapter will show how the need for identity may be conflict 
provoking, where identity groups are used as the vehicle by which individuals ensure 
that their basic needs are met. Finally, this chapter will relate identity needs to the 
concepts of nationalism and religious nationalism in order to show how the salience of 
the identity group chosen may influence conflict. 
I 
Unlike theories of social conflict as espoused by, say, the political realists, Human 
Needs Theory does not make inductive analyses from the basis of an untestable 
hypothesis regarding the inherent goodness of badness of human nature (Rosati, 
Carroll & Coate: 1990: 160). Rather, human needs theorists make deductive analyses 
of the human condition by developing a theory based on fundamental assumptions 
about human behaviour and by paying attention to the impact that needs have on 
behaviour. Because needs theories recognise that the inherently conflictual and 
complex nature of the human condition causes individuals to join specific groups in 
the pursuit of the satisfaction of needs that are essential to human existence and full 
development, they provide a more realistic understanding of the sources that motivate 
human behaviour (Rosati, Carroll & Coate: 1990: 159). 
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While theorists tend to assume that a basic set of universal needs exists as a result of 
man's "human-ness," and they further assume that this basic set contains both 
physiological and psychological elements, the difficulties of directly observing needs 
and observing the degree to which these are met pose problems for the theory as a 
whole (Rosati, Carroll & Coate: 1990: 163 - 165). Further, the problem exists of 
determining exactly what the nature of these needs are: are they universals or are they 
culturally grounded; are they determined by socialisation or are they ontological 
givens? The contention of this thesis is that needs are universal requirements for 
human development and survival. Further, while needs may be manifested in various 
ways, this is a result of the more socially determined expression of needs through the 
values, interests and desires of specific communities. While needs may appear to 
differ across time and space, basic needs - both material and nomnaterial - exist. 
However, the expression of these needs, and the manifestation of needs deprivation 
may vary according to specific social contexts. 
Masini (in Sites: 1990: 10) argues that 
needs can be understood abstractly to refer to those human requirements calling 
for a response that makes human survival and development possible in a given 
situation. 
Burton (in Christie: 1997: 316) notes that, while needs are universal and thus 
commonly held by all, the expression of needs only becomes apparent in changing 
social and political conditions. As such, while the need for security is constant and 
universal, it may only become apparent in situations of danger or threat to the 
individual or group. 
Maslow (in Fisher: 1990: 91) provides a hierarchy of needs, where lower order needs 
need to be satisfied before higher order needs are considered. His hierarchy includes 
self-actualisation needs, esteem needs, aesthetic needs, cognitive needs, 
belongingness needs, safety needs and physiological needs. Galtung (1980: 68), 
however, notes the inherent problem in seeing needs in a hierarchical fashion as this 
places a primacy on completely satisfying physiological (material) needs before 
focussing attention on other needs. A hierarchical ordering of needs thus fails to take 
into account that material needs are often subordinated to other, non-material needs in 
11 
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certain circumstances (Gal tung in Rubenstein: 1990: 341). Similarly, Lederer (in 
Fisher: 1990: 92) suggests that a hierarchical ordering of needs suggests a distinction 
between more and less basic needs with respect to the urgency of satisfaction where, 
in fact, the higher order needs in Maslow's hierarchy are equally important for human 
development once extreme material deprivation has been overcome. 
While Maslow's hierarchical ordering of needs is problematic, the satisfaction of 
basic needs - both physiological and psychological - is essential for the survival and 
development of individuals. Needs, then, are inherent drives for survival and 
development (Burton: 1990: 39). Burton (1990: 37) argues that these basic needs will 
be pursued by individuals and, in situations where basic needs are not satisfied within 
the norms of society, "behaviour that is outside the legal norms of society" will arise. 
So, while needs are generally satisfied through socially sanctioned activities, where 
this is impossible, individuals attempt to satisfy needs through proscribed means 
(Christie: 1997: 316). 
One must, however, draw a distinction between needs, interests and values. According 
to Galtung (1980: 59), needs are tied to the concept of necessity in terms of what it 
means to be human, and these are generally universal. In contrast, interests and values 
are more temporal and are also historically determined (Roy: 1990: 121). According 
to Burton (1990: 37), values are "those ideas, habits, customs and beliefs that are 
characteristic of particular social communities." Values are those linguistic, religious, 
class or ethnic features that lead to the formation of different identity groups. Burton 
(1990: 37) further argues that in situations of oppression, discrimination and 
underprivilege, the defence of values is integral to security and identity needs, and 
that the preservation of values in these situations is the basis of defensive and 
aggressive behaviour. Interests are those social, political and economic aspirations of 
individuals and identity groups in society that influence the policies and tactics of 
groups pursuing satisfaction of needs and values. In contrast to needs and, on 
occasion, values, interests are not an inherent part of the individual. Further, they 
typically relate to material goods and are thus negotiable (Burton: 1990: 38). Values 
and interests are thus closely tied to socialisation and a specific social, political and 
economic environment, and these shape and limit how individuals may act on and 
interpret their needs (Rosati, Carroll & Coate: 1990: 168). 
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Sites (1990: 24) argues that it makes no sense to speak of a need for identity. While 
Maslow and other theorists believe that there is a need to belong to a group, and a 
need for freedom, according to Sites (1990: 24), these are not needs but necessary 
conditions for the satisfaction of needs. So, if needs are to be satisfied, it is necessary 
for persons to be both free , and meaningfully included in groups. Further, Sites (1990: 
24) argues that to speak of the need for identity is nonsensical to the extent that all 
people have an identity of one sort or another, and that many groups provide a basis 
for identity. He argues that people who have an "identity problem" are those who are 
not included meaningfully in a group (a necessary condition for need satisfaction). 
The argument is thus that the perceived need for identity is not a need so much as a 
necessary condition (at least in terms of social identity and identity group formation) 
for the gratification of other needs. 
In contrast, Roy (1990: 136) argues that identity needs are composed of both self-
esteem and social recognition needs. Due to the fact that identity is not static but open 
to diverse and often incompatible stimuli, an individual selects that which he or she 
aspires to be. Thus, 
out of the list of numerous selves, the seeker of his truest, strongest, deepest self, 
as William James insists 'pick[s] out the one on which to stake his salvation' 
(Roy: 1990: 136). 
In building a self-identity, it is important for the individual that others recognise what 
he or she aspires to be. The individual's concept of self, of personal identity, is taken 
from the position of evaluation by others. Without recognition of the self by others, 
the need for self-esteem goes unmet. Without recognition of the self by others, the 
personal or social identity of the individual cannot be formed. The need for identity 
that Sites disputes is comprised of the inter-related needs of self-esteem and 
recognition by others, where individuals select a dominant group identity in times of 
conflict or social change. 
On the whole, human needs theories have tended to ignore the essential role that 
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society plays in the development of the individual, as society is considered to be 
merely instrumental in helping individuals to realise their purpose or needs (Roy: 
1990: 132). As such, it is necessary to consider social identity theory and social 
psychology in an examination of needs theory in order to provide a more 
comprehensive account of identity formation and of the pivotal role that society plays, 
not only in identity formation, but also in group conflict. 
Social identity theory is based on a recognition of early differentiation between the 
self and others, where the individual's identity is not constant, but rather a shifting 
framework based on interactions between the self and the environment (Jabri: 1996: 
125). Nudler (in Fisher: 1990: 94) argues that identity is developed and maintained 
through the process of interaction between the individual and his/her social and 
political environment. As such, the need for identity is one that is determined more by 
social structures than the motivations of individual actors . Similarly, Mead (in Roy: 
1990: 135) argues that personal identity is constructed through social interaction 
where, 
through the assumption of roles and the learning and use of language, individuals 
internalise the attitudes and beliefs of others and develop the faculty of seeing 
themselves as others see them. 
While the individual as unit of analysis is useful in pointing to identity needs as 
fundamental to individual survival and well-being, individual survival and well-being 
impacts on societal survival and well-being (J abri: 1996: 122). Thus, individual needs 
for identity may be extrapolated to the collectivity where a violation of identational 
expression has both individual and collective consequences (Jabri: 1996: 122). 
Searle-White (2001: 50) notes that an individual's sense of self derives from two 
aspects . The first of these is personal identity, an identity that derives from individual 
history and experiences. The second aspect is that of a social identity that derives 
from an individual's membership of various social groups. Social identity is the 
individual's "knowledge that he belongs to a certain social group (or groups) together 
with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tjafel in 
Cottam & Cottam: 2001: 89). As such, personal and group identity are both an 
inherent part of the individual Self. 
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In order to cope with the complexity of modem society, Cottam and Cotta.'1l (2001: 
88) suggest that individuals impose order and organise their social environment 
through the categorisation of people and objects. This identification of socially 
significant groupings, then, provides meaning and structure in a complicated world. 
Social identity thus serves the necessary function of ordering the environment in order 
to provide a system of self-reference and create and define an individual's place in 
society (Cottam & Cottam: 2001: 89). 
Social identity theory, then, considers self-identity as actualised through group 
identification, where individuals pursue their interests and need satisfaction through 
their identity groups (Azar: 1990: 147). The link between the individual and the group 
is thus provided by social identity theory, as individual needs are pursued through 
group identification and action. The individual's self-esteem and ·self-worth needs are 
realised through group interaction, and identity then becomes the primary vehicle 
through which groups satisfy needs. 
The individual's self-esteem is thus tied to both social identity, and the need for to 
strive for a positive self-image. Integral to this is the process of social comparison, 
where an individual's and group's self-esteem is enhanced by perceptions of one's 
group as distinct and different from other groups and better than other groups (Cottam 
& Cottam: 2001: 89). 
The propositions that derive from this are that (I) individuals strive to maintain a 
positive self-image and social identity, (2) membership of a group contributes to 
social identity, (3) comparisons with other groups form the basis of evaluation of 
one's own group, and (4) positive social identity is based on positive comparisons 
(Fisher: 1990: 95 - 96). Thus, pressure to maintain distinctiveness and to evaluate the 
in-group positively lead to discrimination between groups. Fisher (1990: 96) thus 
argues that the basic need for social identity fuels the comparative process between 
groups, and this results in discrimination between groups. 
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Many needs theorists consider the concept of identity, and social identity in particular, 
to be a fundamental requirement for human development, and thus central to ongoing 
ethnic and religious conflicts. Podestra (in Christie: 1997: 319) examined conflicts in 
25 countries and discovered that all these conflicts were rooted in the need to assert 
group identity and the fear of group extinction. In recent works on the causes and 
effects of political violence, the importance of identity needs has taken a place of 
central importance. J abri (1996: 345) argues that needs associated with identity - self-
identification, group-identification, recognition and belonging needs - constitute a 
useful paradigm through which to analyse conflict. The analysis of conflict in terms of 
identity needs indicates the similarities between seemingly disparate forms of conflict. 
Further, identity needs suggest a relation between individual psychology and group 
behaviour, where, in many cases of ethnic, national or religious conflict, needs for 
welfare, freedom and security are subordinated to needs of identity, recognition and 
belongingness (Jabri: 1996: 345 - 346). 
Fisher (1990: 104) argues that group identity is supportive of self-esteem, as, when 
the group is threatened, the individual members of that group feel threatened in a 
personal sense. Fisher thus argues that a threat toward the fundamental identity of a 
group operates at both group and individual levels, and this enhances the potential for 
intergroup conflict. Finally, Klineberg argues that the need to belong to and identify 
wi th a group is almost universal and, as a result, 
human beings are willing to suffer immeasurably and to sacrifice - and in some 
cases take - their own lives in the struggle for and the protection of their identity 
(Fisher: 1990: 95). 
Social identity theorists combine the concepts of self-esteem, social identity and 
social comparison in order to explain intergroup discrimination and conflict. Group 
formation and group differentiation provide the underlying causes of emergent 
conflicts, where the need for positive self-esteem is seen as a prime motivating force 
in group membership and social categorisation (Jabri: 1996: 125). Social identity 
theory posits a 'natural' human tendency to partition the world into comprehensible 
units, where these units are generally identity groups. Social identity, then, is clarified 
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by comparison with other groups and a desire for positive self-evaluation provides the 
motive for differentiation between the in- and out-groups (Jabri: 1996: 124). This 
process of differentiation thus forms the basis of intergroup discrimination where an 
individual not only identifies with a group, but also has a drive to "enhance and 
protect the identifications he or she has made" (Bloom in Jabri: 1996: 124). 
Thus Sherif (in Fisher: 1990: 95) argues that intergroup behaviour involves 
individuals interacting in terms of their group identifications. The mere perception of 
belonging to a group stimulates intergroup discrimination without there necessarily 
being a conflict of interests (Fisher: 1990: 95). The key concept in explaining this 
discrimination is that of social identity -
those aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories 
to which he or she belongs and the emotional and value significance of such 
membership. Social identity is seen as an important contributor to an individual's 
self-esteem or positive self-concept (Fisher: 1990: 95). 
In terms of social identity and conflict, Fisher (1990: 103) argues that conflicts of 
interests, values, needs or power cause intergroup conflict as conflict over material 
needs is encompassed in competing interests that generally relate to resource scarcity. 
So, 
because people want to evaluate their group positively in comparison with 
others, conflict can occur over scarce social resources, economic resources, 
territory, values, ideology, and unmet needs regarding identity, security, status or 
power (Cottam & Cottam: 2001: 89). 
Following the arguments of Burton and Azar (in Fisher: 1990: 103), all social groups 
have fundamental needs for recognition, identity, security and participation, and, 
when these needs go unmet, one finds a push for redress or need satisfaction. 
The discrimination that arises between groups leads to destructive social interaction, 
according to Fisher (1990: 103), as conflict over need-satisfiers creates a mutually 
competitive attitude between groups. Further, conflict, cultural differences, the 
competitive orientation of groups, and a history of antagonism cause a perceived 
threat among the groups. This, according to Fisher, results in ethnocentrism, where 
one finds in-group solidarity and out-group hostility. 
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In terms of recognition, identity and security, if the actions of the other group are 
perceived to limit or deny these needs in any way, then the social group is placed in a 
position where its existence is threatened (Fisher: 1990: 104). This further stimulates 
in-group loyalty and results in a deterioration of intergroup relations, particularly as a 
result of the fact that group identity and cohesion is related to ethnocentrism, and self-
esteem is positively related to group identity and cohesion, and negatively related to 
perceived threat. 
While Fisher frames his argument in terms of ethnocentrism, the argument is not 
exclusive to ethnocentric discrimination. The formation of identity groups results in 
intergroup discrimination, where the identity groups are not necessarily based on 
ethnic identification, but may be religious, gender-based, or class-based. Individual 
identity is comprised of multiple group identifications and, in times of conflict or 
social change, the individual selects a dominant identity, and thus a dominant identity 
group, through which to pursue need satisfaction. Christie (1997: 143) threfore argues 
that individuals pick and choose particular identities depending on particular issues, 
and "the quest for self-determination takes various forms at different times and places 
and renders different identities meaningful because they serve as its vehicle." 
Important for conflict resolution then, is the recognition of the multiple shifting 
identities of individuals. In conflict situations, the multiple identities of individuals 
come to be expressed in terms of one dominant identity that arises from individuals ' 
membership of bounded communities (Jabri: 1996: ll9 - 120). Further, in choosing a 
salient identity, individuals must make relevant group comparisons. So, 
one's political-group identifications, for example, will become highly salient and 
influential on behaviour when issues settled in the political system are under 
consideration (Cottam & Cottam: 2001: 91) . 
Finally, according to Jabri (1996: 128 - 129), the conduct and articulations of identity 
are situated historically, where "memories, myths, symbolic orders, and self-imagery 
form a constitutive part of the practical consciousness of situated individuals," and 
thus fom1 a background that provides meaning to identity. Further, because identities 
are constructed as 'self in relation to an 'other,' and because the construction of 
identity involves the active selection of particular modes of representation, the ability 
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to consolidate and reproduce authoritative power is dependent on the capacity to 
manipulate the memory traces of a community (J abri: 1996: 131). Thus, while 
episodic ceremonials, symbolic representations, images of past glories and 
present achievements reinforce a sense of identity among the masses called upon 
in time of mobilisation for conflict, 
the decision of the individual to support such action "is based on her or his need for 
identity" (Jabri: 1996: 132, 123). 
When considering conflicts in terms of needs theory, it is necessary to consider the 
goals and tactics of the groups concerned. According to Burton (1990 : 41), fierce or 
violent opposition can result fTom different responses to common conditions, even by 
persons and groups who have shared goals. The reason for this is the different tactics 
that different groups may use to attempt to achieve the same objective, and the tactic 
chosen - the choice of satisfier - may be conflict creating. The point here is that when 
analysing a conflict, one needs to separate out the goals and tactics - the negotiable 
differences over choice of satisfiers - from the non-negotiable needs which are held in 
common (Burton: 1990: 41). 
Burton (1990: 41) argues that belief systems often govern tactics - when the nature of 
a problem is not understood, the approach that is adopted may not relate to the 
essence of the problem. The example that Burton cites to illustrate this is that the 
problem might be an increase in terrorism, the goal is to abolish this, but the tactic 
dictated by a belief system or a prejudice may not target the real cause of the problem. 
So, for example, the tactic might be to further suppress minority groups, when this 
would actually only exacerbate the problem. 
For this reason, human needs theory needs to address the issue of ideology. Burton 
(1990: 41) argues ideologies are generally put forward as values and goals, but they 
could also be tactics. The need, then, is to differentiate between ideologies, goals and 
tactics. Needs, values and interests determine political objectives. As we have already 
established, 
human needs are universal and, therefore, held in common. Cultural and other 
values are shared to a large degree in any society. Interests, however, separate 
members of societies into groupings, frequently in opposition to each other 
(Burton: 1990: 42). 
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According to this framework, then, the fundamental goals of different ideologies 
would be similar - there may be differences in interests, and possibly in values, but 
needs are universal, and would thus be held in common. 
Thus, Rosati, Carroll and Coate (1990: 170) argue that ideology affects the way that 
individuals and groups perceive their needs due to the power of those in authority 
over communication. While individuals pick and choose identities as required by 
different social situations, this argument merely implies that because the articulations 
of identity are situated historically - as memories, myths or symbolic orders - and thus 
form a background that creates meaning, the capacity of different groups to 
manipulate the memory traces of a community impact on the mobilisation of support 
for that specific identity. Ideologies impact on individuals' perception or awareness of 
the level of need satisfaction, and this influences not only the degree to which 
individuals participate in socio-political relationships, but also the extent to which 
social and political structures are viewed as legitimate (Rosati, Carroll & Coate: 1990: 
169). As such, ideology can explain why individuals or groups take action in order to 
satisfy unmet needs, as ideology determines the extent to which individuals are truly 
conscious of their socio-economic and political situations. As ideologies may alter the 
individual's consciousness of needs deprivation and reveal the exploited power in 
situations of deprivation, the awareness that they create may be enough to cause 
groups to challenge the status quo (Rosati, CalToll & Coate: 1990: 171). 
Burton (1990: 44 - 45) notes that ideologies such as "fundamentalism" are emerging 
in states where unsolved problems are giving rise to frustration and desperation, and 
these extreme responses are characterised by high levels of both state and individual 
violence. These ideologies do not address the sources of the problem, but rather 
provide a rationalisation or justification of pragmatic responses to desperate 
situations. The different responses to commonly experienced conditions, the different 
tactics used, give rise to fierce and violent conflict, where the root of that conflict is 
not the tactic used, but the deprivation of needs of individuals or identity groups. 
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According to Hastings (1997: 3), a nation may be formed from one or more 
ethnicities, but possesses or at least claims to possess the right to political identity, 
autonomy, and control over a specific territory. Nationalism may thus either be 
considered to be a theory or a practice of this belief. As a theory, nationalism is 
profoundly ideological, and assumes that the world is divided into groups of people 
with distinct characteristics and notes that these groups have an entitlement to a 
certain piece of land (Halliday: 2000: 32). Further, nationalism as an ideology 
assumes that these groups' entitlement to the practice of their own customs in an 
autonomous territory should be respected by other groups. 
As a practice, nationalism involves the belief that a specific ethnic or national 
tradition is valuable and needs protection within the bounds of a nation-state. As such, 
nationalism is most likely to arise where a specific ethnicity or nation feels itself 
under threat (Hastings: 19973). Further, Halliday (2000: 32) argues that, as a practice, 
nationalism comprises a set of movements that assert a right to self-determination, and 
that this is achieved through these movements' definition of what the nation is, who 
its people are, and what characteristics, culture, history and language this nation is to 
have. As a practice, then, Juergensmeyer (1993: 6) argues that nationalism involves 
not only the extremes of patriotism, but also 
more subdued expressions of identity based on shared assumptions regarding 
why a community constitutes a nation and why the state that rules it is legitimate. 
According to Anderson (in Searle-White: 2001: 52), a nation is "an imagined political 
community - and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign." As such, a 
nation is a community where the belief exists that each individual is connected to 
other members of that community. This belief need not be based solely on physical or 
economic connections between people but, more importantly, it is based on the 
psychological connection between members of that community that makes the nation 
real. So, "these connections do not have to be historically 'true'; they simply need to 
be psychologically real" (Searle-White: 2001: 53). 
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While some theories of nationalism ascribe the power of nationalism to the fact that 
nations are historical entities that have developed over centuries, and with them have 
developed tradition, roots and historical narratives, the modernist view of nationalism 
involves the conferral of legitimacy on the modem state (Halliday: 2000: 37). In this 
view, nationalist movements make use of history in order to mobilise political support 
and this, further, 
involves not the reproduction of a given identity or tradition so much as the 
selection, reformulation and, if necessary, invention of symbols and narratives to 
suit present purposes" (Halliday: 2000: 37). 
According to Halliday (2000: 37 - 38), there is thus no one given identity or past from 
which these movements draw, but rather a range of symbols that they may 
appropriate in order to suit their political purposes and the past thus provides a means 
of conferring legitimacy on present actions. The point of this argument is not to claim 
that the historical link that nations may have with a certain territory is empty, but 
rather to show that the history and identity of a given people may be moulded by 
nationalist groups in order to confer legitimacy on a certain political state of affairs, 
and justify certain actions. Nationalism, then, is not a static concept, but one that is 
constantly changing and contingent on present needs in a community. Halliday (2000: 
41) thus argues that nationalism 
is not a matter, as nationalists present it, of a 'true' versus a 'false' definition of 
identity, but shifts in identity and arguments about it, corresponding to shifting 
social and political relations. 
National identity, then, evolves and changes in response to changing social conditions 
or through explicit efforts of certain groups (Searle-White: 2001: 57 - 58). Shifts and 
changes in national identity come about as a result of the need of groups and 
individuals in those groups to evaluate themselves positively. 
The relevance of social identity theory to nationalism is that, if the nation provides an 
opportunity for individuals to evaluate themselves positively, then it is likely that 
individuals will identify with that national group (Searl-White: 2001: 62). 
Furthermore, nationalism provides more opportunities for positive in-group evaluation 
in the current world context. Firstly, the status that nationhood provides - the ability 
to give citizenship, receive international aid, and sit in the United Nations - makes 
national groups striving for independence valuable to identify with because "it may 
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achieve these markers of status vis-a-vis other national groups" (Searle-White: 2001 : 
62 - 63). Secondly, the international system privileges the self-determination of 
national groups. Thus, in terms of international respect, national groups are valuable 
to identify with. National identity, then, provides the means for a positive social 
identity as, if individuals believe that a group identity will enhance their self-esteem, 
then they will identify with that group, particularly ''when they are suffering economic 
or social deprivation that diminishes their sense of self-esteem (Searle-White: 2001: 
63 - 64). 
National identity also becomes salient when it is under threat. Because self-perception 
is evaluative, individuals affiliate with national identities because they provide a 
means of improving self-esteem through positive evaluation with other national 
groups (Searle-White: 2001: 64). 
Changes in the social-political context, such as a potential bid for independence 
or a threat to some aspect of our integrity as a people, intensify that identification 
(Searle-White: 2001: 64). 
Finally, because national identity is continually shifting and evolving, and because it 
is contingent on historical and social circumstances, a religious identity can serve the 
same function as a national identity (Searle-White: 2001: 65). 
At first sight, the concept of religious nationalism - the attempt to link religion to the 
modem nation-state (Juergensmeyer: 1993: 40) - appears antithetical for, as Halliday 
(2000: 26) argues, 
once you invoke religion as a legitimation of description of difference, then you 
have forfeited the right to talk in terms of divisions in the contemporary world, 
sovereign states or 'national' cultures. 
For this reason, secular nationalism and religion are often presented as rivals, where 
the presence of one undermines the importance of the other. Conversely, it has been 
argued that it is the similarities between secular nationalism and religion that situate 
these two belief systems in opposition to one another. Smart (in Juergensmeyer: 
1993: 15) argues that both religion and nationalism incorporate doctrine, myth, ethics, 
ritual, experience and social organisation. Further, both provide the 
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ethical function of providing an overarching framework of moral order, a 
framework that commands ultimate loyalty from those who subscribe to it" 
(Juergensmeyer: 1993: 15). 
Similarly, Armstrong (1997: 597) argues that both nationalism and religion appeal to 
the "human urge for identification with movements that transcend the individual," 
and thus, particularly in times of social transformation, the need for protection against 
a breakdown of identity may be provided for by nationalist or religious movements. 
According to Juergensmeyer (1996: 4 - 8), three types of religious nationalism may be 
distinguished. The first is that of ethnic religious nationalism, where religion is 
politicised in tem1S of people and land, and where certain groups wish to establish a 
political identity of their own. The second religious nationalism is ideological in 
nature. In the realm of ideas and beliefs, this form of nationalism combines religious 
elements with the notion of the modem nation-state, and thus "religionises" politics 
by placing political issues in a sacred context. The final type of nationalism, one that 
is of particular importance for this thesis, is that of ethno-ideological religious 
nationalism. According to Juergensmeyer (1996: 8), ethno-ideological religious 
nationalism occurs where movements tap traditional symbols and beliefs for a new 
framework of ideas for a social order, and act both against ethnic rivals and against 
secular leaders of their own ethnic group. 
Ethno-ideological religious nationalism develops within groups that have become 
disillusioned with secular nationalism and thus not only assert the legitimacy of 
traditional values, but also attempt to define a group identity based on these traditional 
values (Juergensmeyer: 1996: 9 - 10). Further, these groups perceive that the problem 
with politics is religious at some level, and they argue, therefore, that political 
problems have religious causes, and that religious goals may have political solutions 
(Juergensmeyer: 1996: 11). The third step in the development of religious nationalism 
is the identification of the enemy, where this enemy is identified as the source of 
social problems, and is portrayed in religious terms. Finally, the result of ethno-
ideological religious nationalism is that violent images are given religious meaning, 
and this religious overtone tends to legitimise and sanitise acts of violence 
(Juergensmeyer: 1996: 15 - 16). 
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Young (in Cottam & Cottam: 2001: 29) suggests that common religious identity is 
recognised as a source of political unity that may override other identity differences. 
This makes religion both a historical rival and ally of nationalism. Many modem 
identity conflicts involve groups that have a religious-sectarian identity component'. 
As such, religious communities may provide a primary community base for nation-
statehood, and can, therefore, tend to parallel nationalist manifestations (Cottom & 
Cottam: 2001: 30). 
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Social identity theory thus considers the very notion of identity to be both inherently 
competitive and conflictual. Furthermore, where the primary mobilising identity is 
that of nationalism or religious nationalism, group identifications tend to be stronger, 
and thus more likely to lead to conflict, particularly where this identity is considered 
to be under threat. The following chapter will consider the importance of identity in 
the Israel!Palestine conflict, where a religious identity has been mobilised through the 
Islamisation of society, and where this identity has great implications, both for the 
course of the conflict, and for attempted resolution thereof. 
, See, for example, the conflicts of Northern Ireland, Lebanon and the post Cold War Yugoslavian 
conflicts. 
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Chapter 2 
"By looking at the Islamist upsurge simply as a result of the failure of the regimes in 
power we prevent ourselves from understanding the secret of its capacity to 
mobilise. " 
- Burgat, F. (2004: 43) 
The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, far from solely being a conflict over material 
resources, is a conflict over identity and threats to the identity of two peoples. As the 
dominant identities being mobilised in the conflict have changed, one needs to analyse 
the conflict in terms of social identity and human needs theory in order to fully 
understand it. 
The rise in popularity ofIslamism in the region, together with the increased emphasis 
placed on Islamic identity in Palestine, has altered the conflict to the extent that 
religion is used to sanction acts of violence and Islamist movements have largely de-
railed any attempts at settlement of the conflict. 
This chapter proposes to investigate the changing nature of nationalism and national 
identity in Palestine, considering why Islamist movements have surpassed secular 
nationalist movements in mobilising a Palestinian Islamic identity. Secondly, this 
chapter aims to consider how Hamas has Islamised the identity of Palestinians by 
constructing an Islamic national identity. The Islamisation of identity in Palestine has 
had great consequences both for the conflict itself, and for proposed settlement 
thereof. The third and fourth sections of this chapter propose to analyse the effect of 
Islamisation in the escalation of the conflict, and the resultant effects on the 
negotiation process respectively. 
I 
In the Arab world, collective identities contain multiple components, with religion, 
Arab nationalism and territorial patriotism being the most important (Litvak: 
http://www.dayan.orgld&a-han1as-litvak.htm). While these elements of identity are 
not exclusive and do often complement one another, the emphasis given to each of 
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these identities depends on the historical developments of a given time and place. The 
Arab-Israeli conflict has passed through various phases, each adding a different 
dimension to the type of conflict. 
The conflict began as a conflict between two nationalist groups - Zionism and 
Palestinian nationalism - each claiming rights to the same territory (Litvak: 1998: 
148). After the 1936 Palestinian rebellion, the conflict came to encompass various 
Arab states, and from the 1950s, the conflict was considered to be a struggle between 
Israel - perceived as a bridgehead of Western Imperialism - and pan-Arab 
nationalism. With the growing power and legitimacy of territorial states in the region, 
the conflict transformed from that of a zero-sum game between rival nationalist 
movements into a conflict between states (Litvak: 1998: 148). The Islamisation of the 
conflict, however, has situated it as a battle between two rival religions - Islam and 
Judaism. 
Litvak (1998: 148) notes that 
the religious idiom has always played an important role in the evolution of 
Palestinian nationalism and in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. 
Previously, though, nationalist Palestinian elites made use of Islamic symbols and 
themes in order to mobilise support for a national cause whose aims were largely 
political and secular. The rise of political Islam in the Middle East, and particularly in 
the Palestinian conflict has, however, presented a change from past patterns, leading 
to a new perception that the root causes and essence of the conflict are based in a war 
between religions (Litvak: 1998: 149). 
According to Esposito (1984: 60), European colonialism precipitated a major crisis in 
Muslim identity where, near the end of the nineteenth century, the Islamic world had 
largely succumbed - politically, economically and militarily - to European 
colonialism. Further, he argues that this crisis of identity has affected the political 
aspirations of Muslims in the modem era. 
A contradiction appears to exist, though, between the particularism of nationalism and 
the universal nature of Islam, and, as such, despite the fact that Islam "provides a 
national identity" (Gellner in Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
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Islamist movements have generally been ambivalent towards nationalism. These 
movements have, however, been forced to accommodate nationalist sentiments in 
their teachings due to the rise of nationalism as a dominant ideology and political 
force in the region as early as the 1930s. In addition, the growing power of territorial 
states in the Middle East has transformed the notion of the pan-Islamic ideal into one 
that could only be fulfilled in the very distant future, if ever (Litvak: 
http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). In addition, Esposito (1984: 60) argues 
that Islam been integral to the rise of nationalism and religious nationalism to the 
extent that the modem nation has been redefined and legitimised to take precedence 
over a pan-Islamic community. So, despite the pan-Islamic rhetoric of Islamist 
movements, the reality of Islam's division into territorial nation-states has largely 
been accepted by Islamists in the Middle East, and these movements are thus 
organised along the lines of territorial units, and limit their activities to their 
respective states (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
The founding of Ramas at the beginning of the 1987 Palestinian Intifada by the 
Muslim Brethren was aimed at allowing that organisation to playa major role in 
Palestinian politics. Ramas' ideology was thus formulated not only in order to provide 
a rival to the secular nationalism of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation (PLO), but 
also to refute Zionist-Israeli claims to the land (Litvak: 1998 : 149). Furthermore, 
because of the unresolved questions of Palestinian nation-formation and statehood, 
Ramas has had to present itself as a religious as well as a nationalist alternative to the 
secular PLO leadership in order to appeal to a wider constituency (Litvak: 
http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htrn). The formation of Ramas then, was the 
result not only of a growing Palestinian nationalist orientation in the region, but also 
of a desire to pursue a leadership role in Palestinian politics (Litvak: 
http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htrn) at a time when the PLO was politically 
and financially strangled by Israel and thus perceived as incapable of satisfying the 
aspirations of Palestinians (Keppel: 2003: 152). 
An emphasis on the "Islamic essence" of the Palestinian cause lies at the heard of 
Ramas' ideology (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). Ramas 
argues that the PLO misconstrues the conflict by portraying it as a conflict between 
Palestinian nationalism and Zionism when, in fact, the Palestinian predicament is 
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caused by the absence of Islam from the realities of Palestinian society (Litvak: 1998: 
149), and the Palestinian cause is thus "not about land and soil, but it is about faith 
and belief' (Ramas, quoted in Litvak: 1998: 148). Furthermore, Ramas argues that the 
liberation of Palestine can only be accomplished through Islam, since this is the only 
ideology "that can mobilise the full potentials of the people" (Litvak: 1998: 149). 
In order to resolve the inherent tension between the religious and nationalist 
sentiments present in its ideology, Ramas has argued that the struggle with Israel is, in 
fact, a religious struggle between Islam and Judaism (Ganor: 
http://www.ict.org.illarticles/articledet.cfrn?articleid=2). The movement thus argues 
that its short-term goal is the establishment of an Islamic state in a liberated Palestine, 
after which a universal Islamic state presents the next challenge. The expanding 
concentric circles of liberation for Ramas, then, include first, Palestine, followed by 
Arab liberation, and, finally, the liberation of Islam (Litvak: 
http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-Iitvak.htm). Ramas has thus reconciled the 
contradiction between its pan-Islamic character and its specifically nationalist 
aspirations by presenting nationalism as a part of religious belief. 
Furthermore, 
if Ramas had to accommodate nationalism because of the intifada, it did so by 
reinventing an Islamist tradition that is now regarded, especially among those 
generations politically forged by the intifada, as an integral part of Palestinian 
national identity (Usher: 1997: 348). 
The success and popularity of Ramas may be attributed to a number of factors. 
Firstly, the movement gained great popularity, particularly in Gaza, where socio-
economic hardship has nourished Islamic influence in the area, and where Ramas' 
emphasis on a solution that would include the liberation of all Palestine is attractive 
to the population. The bulk of support for Islamist movements in Palestine is drawn 
from socially conservative sectors of the popUlation, who focus on the application of 
Islamic values and law to all social spheres, and are concerned with "the guarantee of 
Palestinians ' human rights as Muslims" (Jarrar in Usher: 1997: 347). These demands 
have, however, become imbued with more overtly nationalist slogans, and the armed 
struggle of movements like Ramas has drawn a larger number of young, militant 
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supporters for whom Islam is not just synonymous with the mosque or shar'ia' rule, 
but also with liberation from Israeli occupation (Usher: 1997: 347). 
Secondly, because the PLO leadership moved away from Palestine, Islamist leaders 
active in Palestine were perceived to be better situated to serve the interests of the 
Palestinians. Finally, the Islamist infrastructure in the territories has enabled Hamas to 
successfully form a social system that has provided an alternate social-political 
structure to that ofthe PLO. The fact that the movement contributes to the daily life of 
Palestinians as well as to the struggle against Israel and occupation has greatly 
increased its prestige amongst the people of Palestine (International Policy Institute 
for Counter-Terrorism: http://www.ict.org.illinter terlorgdet.cfrn?orgid=13). 
In presenting itself as an alternative to the secular PLO while maintaining wide 
support, Hamas has had to incorporate nationalist elements and discourse into its 
Islamic ideology, and has solved the nationalism/Islam dilemma through the 
Islamisation of Palestinian identity and the introduction of Palestinian elements into 
its pan-Islamic ideal (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htrn). The 
movement has transformed nationalist ideology by inscribing it with a religious tone 
of "spiritual and community release" that more secular movements like the PLO are 
felt to lack (Usher: 1997: 348). Islam has thus provided a unifying rallying cry, 
identity and ideology for Palestinians (Esposito: 1984: 60). Movements like Hamas 
have thus accommodated nationalism by a reconstitution of Islamist tradition that is 
now regarded as an integral part of Palestinian identity (Usher: 1997: 248). 
II 
As was argued in the prevlOUS chapter, articulations of identity are situated 
historically, and memories, myths, symbolic orders and the like provide the backdrop 
that provides meaning to identity (Jabri: 1996: 128 - 129). Furthermore, "collective 
identity is constructed by and experienced through shared symbols and 
representations" (Azaryahu & Kook: 2002: 198). 
, Islamic law distilled from holy texts and traditional jurisprudence (Keppel : 2003: 433) 
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The construction of identity is contingent on specific political and historical 
circumstances and reflects prevalent political interests and power relations. More 
importantly, it reflects the needs of political elites and their ability to manipulate 
symbols and notions of common heritage (Azaryahu & Kook: 2002: 199). The 
construction of identity, then, involves the active selection of specific modes of 
representation, and the ability to consolidate and reproduce authoritative power 
depends on the capacity to manipulate the memory traces of a community (Jabri: 
1996: 131). A sense of identity is defined and maintained in terms of attachment to 
symbols and representations, and the power of these to evoke identification is decisive 
in determining the social relevance of these symbols and representations (Azaryahu & 
Kook: 2002: 198). In mobilising an identity in a manner that aims to incite action, it 
must thus appeal to values and symbols that inspire intense, immediate and instinctive 
responses (Humphries: 2001: 61). 
Similarly, Azaryahu and Kook (2002: 196) argue that national identity is a 
thematisation of history in terms of a shared heritage and cultural traditions. As there 
is no one definitive and coherent notion of a national history, it is constructed and 
mediated by groups attempting to gain power or influence social organisation. The 
symbolic construction of identity thus takes place through iconic representations like 
national symbols and national history, and sanctification of territory. In order to attain 
and maintain a political influence in Palestine, then, Hamas has needed to Islamise the 
Palestinian national identity in order to achieve its political aims. 
In order to attain the immediate goal of the liberation of Palestine and the formation of 
an Islamic state, Hamas has embraced national symbols of Palestine and endowed 
these with Islamic meaning in order to turn the struggle for the sake of a Palestinian 
nation into an Islamic struggle for Palestine. So, while Hamas is first and foremost a 
religious movement that would prefer to subordinate nationalist sentiments to Islamic 
ones, it needs to emphasise nationalist sentiments in order to mobilise political 
support (Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
The Islamisation of identity has taken place through the construction of iconic 
representations, the Islamisation of the past, and the sanctification of Palestine. Hamas 
has embraced Palestinian symbols and imbued them with Islamic meaning. For 
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example, while the Muslim Brethren was represented by a green flag with Qur'anic 
messages inscribed on it, Hamas has adopted the Palestinian national flag, modified it 
by including an emblazoned shabada6 and named it the "Islamic Palestinian Flag" 
(Litvak: http: //www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). Likewise, Hamas activists 
wear gowns or masks sewn with the colours of the Palestinian flag during political 
processions and drape coffins of activists with the Palestinian flag. 
Further, Hamas has made use of the map of Palestine in posters, graffiti and emblems 
in order to visually integrate the nationalist and Islamic message that it propagates by 
painting the map with the colours of the Palestinian flag and adding a picture of the 
Dome of the Rock to it. A further example that demonstrates the iconic representation 
ofIslamic nationalism is the modification of the Muslim Brethren emblem by Hamas. 
While the original emblem showed the Qur'an amidst two crossed swords, the 
emblem of Hamas has replaced the Qur'an with the map of Palestine (Litvak: 
http: //www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htrn). 
Nationalist movements tend to shape the past in accordance with present goals and 
aspirations in order to shape a national collective memory, and thus construct a 
national collective identity. Because the Islamic people of Palestine have a shared 
history, myths and collective memory, Hamas has Islamised the conflict, not only to 
expand the support base by the inclusion of the nationalist component, but also by 
reconstituting the collective memory and history of the Palestinian people in order to 
ensure a unified identity group, and to mobilise the Islamic population of Palestine 
into support for violent confrontation. 
While Arab nationalist historiography has argued that the inhabitants of the entire 
Middle East from the time of antiquity have been Arabs, Palestinian historiography 
has attempted to show how Palestinians have maintained distinct features and identity 
throughout history. The purpose of this is not only to shape a collective national 
memory, but also to refute Zionist claims to the territory by establishing a claim to the 
• The Islanile profession offaith (Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
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land that pre-dates that of Israeli settlement (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-
hamas-litvak.htm). 
The rise of Islamist movements as a major political force has led to the emergence of 
an Islamist narrative of Palestinian history. The pre-Islamic past presents a point of 
conflict between nationalist and Islamist depictions of history. While nationalists 
incorporate this past national heritage in order to enhance the legitimacy of the nation 
state, Islamists regard this period as Jahi\i7• 
The version of Palestinian history articulated by Hamas is aimed not only at refuting 
Jewish claims to the territory, but also at providing historical justifications for 
opposing any compromise over Palestine (Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-
litvak.htm). Nabil Shabib (in Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-Iitvak.htm) 
argues that Palestinians' legal and human rights are secondary to their religious-
historical rights as the right of Muslims to Palestine is "a firm historical religious right 
which does not cease or diminish, which stems form our affiliation with Islam." 
Hamas, then, overcomes the problem of the pre-Islamic past by claiming that the land 
of Palestine has been Islamic since the time of the patriarch, Abraham. Islamist 
historiographers argue that Palestine is the place where the first contact took place 
between the divine and the human through the monotheistic message delivered 
through Ibraham (Abraham). Ibrahim is believed to have built the mosque of al-Aqsa 
prior to Muhammad, thereby laying claim to Palestine as Islamic territory from that 
time forward (Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-Iitvak.htm). In pronouncing 
Ibrahim a Muslim, rather than the first pure monotheist, Hamas has readapted the 
classical Islamic view in order to serve current political needs. 
In terms of the modern period, Islamist verSlOns of history highlight the role of 
Shaykb Izz ai-Din al-Qassam8 as the religious leader who first launched armed jihad 
against the British and Zionists. While nationalists tend to avoid mention of Qassam's 
7 "The dark age of ignorance before Islam" (Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
8 A Muslim religious functionary, active in Haifa, who organised a Palestinian guerrilla movement 
against the British and Zionists in 1935. The military units of Hamas, the 'Izz aI-Din al-Qassam 
Brigades, are named after him (Beinin & Stork: 1997: 6). 
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Syrian birthplace for fear of detracting from his Palestinian credentials, Hamas 
stresses the leading role of Qassam's followers who combined religious and patriotic 
activities. Qassam' s role in the 1936 - 1939 rebellion in Palestine allows Hamas to 
answer PLO accusations of the inaction of Islamic groups in the Palestinian national 
struggle by drawing a direct line between its religious and patriotic activities and 
those of al-Qassam and his followers (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-
litvak.htm). 
Finally, Hamas Islamises the intifada by depicting it as a jihad9 that originated by 
divine will in the mosques, in order to prevent a settlement of the Palestinian cause 
that would have been tantamount to a capitulation. The intifada, which broke out after 
twenty years of Israeli occupation, is perceived to embody the emergence of a new 
generation, "imbued with finn Islamic consciousness" after a period of spiritual 
preparation (Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htrn). The intifada IS 
thus depicted as a return of an authentic Islamic identity to the Palestinian people. 
In addition to the Islamisation of history, Palestinian identity is also Islamised through 
the sanctification of Islamic Palestine. Because Hamas has instilled patriotism as part 
of the Islamic belief system, Palestinian identity and patriotism have been imbued 
with spiritual Islamic meaning by sanctifying Palestine as an Islamic holy land 
(Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htrn). In doing so, and in stating that 
"there is no greater patriotism than a situation when the enemy usurps Muslim land," 
Hamas is able to tum the struggle for Palestine from one waged on nationalist grounds 
to one waged on Islamic identity (Litvak: http://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-
litvak.htrn). 
The sanctity of Palestine is based, firstly, on the fact that Allah chose al-Aqsa Mosque 
in Jerusalem as the place for the ascension of the Prophet Muhammad to heaven. The 
importance of al-Aqsa as a holy site is extended to the whole of Palestine, and used by 
Hamas as a justification for distinguishing Palestine from other Islamic states (Litvak: 
http ://www.dayan.orgld&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
9 A lawful or holy war prescribed by the Shar'ia against infidels (Keppel: 2002: 432). 
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The second component of Palestine's sanctity is its designation as a waqrO by the 
Caliph 'Uman ibn al-Khattab. This points, again, to the inclusion of the particularism 
of nationalism in Islamism, despite the fact that this is an invention of tradition, as it 
has no legal basis in Shar'ia law. Hamas' insistence on the designation of Palestine as 
a waqf is aimed not only at sanctifying Palestinian land, but also in preventing 
Palestinian concessions over parts of Palestine as part of a political settlement with 
Israel (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-Iitvak.htm). 
In times of conflict individuals choose that identity that is most likely to advance their 
interests and protect their self-esteem. Through the Islamisation of the Palestinian 
cause, Hamas has emphasised the totality of the struggle in Islamic terms that appeal 
to a disenfranchised, oppressed and alienated community like the Palestinians 
(Ranstorp: 1996: 52). In so doing, Hamas has merged Palestinian identity completely 
with Islam "by making Islam the principle component of Palestinian identity" (Litvak: 
http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
III 
The Islamisation of Palestinian identity by Hamas has had profound effects on how 
the conflict is perceived by Palestinians, and how the violence in the conflict is 
justified. The ability of Hamas to legitimise violent action by appealing to religious 
principles, together with stereotyping of the enemy and the sense of victimisation 
within the conflict, have all been central to the ongoing and seemingly intractable 
nature of the IsraellPalestine conflict. 
Hamas pursues its ideological VISIon III uncompromlSlng holy terms as a battle 
between good and evil, where the distinction between the faithful and those standing 
outside the group "is reinforced in the daily discourse of the clerics" (Ranstorp : 1996: 
51). Furthermore, the language of the clerics shapes the reality of the followers, 
reinforcing the loyalty and social obligation of members to the group, and reminding 
them of sacrifices that have already been made for the struggle (Ranstorp: 1996: 51). 
In doing this, Hamas draws heavi ly on religious symbolism and rituals in order to 
10 An inalienable religious endowment (Litvak: http://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). 
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reinforce a sense of collectivity. In this way, the totality of the struggle, perceived as 
an all-out war against its enemy, is often used to justifY the level and intensity of 
violence. 
Perhaps the most dangerous aspect of religious nationalism is that the invocation of 
religion may be used to legitimise the use of violence. Juergensmeyer (1994: 171) 
argues that 
because religion has the ability to give moral sanction to violence, and violence 
is the most potent force that a nonlegal entity can possess, religion can be a 
potent political tool. 
Religious extremists, while regularly striking at symbols of tyranny are relatively 
unconstrained in the lethality and indiscriminate nature of violence used. They view 
themselves as a divinely 'chosen people,' who possess religious sanction and 
justification for the violence, and also "often act out of the belief that the violence 
occurs in a divinely sanctioned juncture in history" (Ranstorp: 1996: 54). 
In the case of Hanlas, while religious principles provide it with credibility and 
legitimacy, and the Islamic base of the movement provides it with support by virtue of 
the Islamisation of identity, these same principles have also provided it with the 
ability to justify its use of force (Juergensmeyer: 2000: 79). As such, Litvak (1998: 
156) argues that 
The struggle against Israel, then, is a jihad for the sake of God, which should 
never be abandoned ... Unlike the PLO, however, Rarnas endows its jihad with 
religious meaning, declaring that it is fighting not only for the liberation of the 
homeland, but equally important in order to defend 'the Muslim person, Islamic 
culture, and Muslim holy sites, first and foremost among them al-Aqsa in 
Jerusalem. ' 
Cottam and Cottam (2001: 94) note that because personal identity is intricately tied 
up with group identity, where a cohesive group exists, members are more willing to 
make personal sacrifices for the group, as self-definition is contingent on group 
survival. An individual has a sense of importance because what she does in the group 
is important as it relates to the history of her people and their future . The meaning of 
an individual's life extends beyond just her, as, even if she were to die in the conflict, 
this would have meaning to the extent that it was in service of a greater goal (Searle-
White: 2001: 98). 
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Thus, in drawing on religious symbolism to reinforce a sense of collectivity, Ramas 
also emphasises the reputation of the Ramas fighters . In emphasising the Islamic 
essence of the conflict, Ramas has glorified martyrdom based on Qur'anic passages 
promising everlasting life to those who die for the sake of God (Litvak: 1998: 158). 
To this end, Ramas has lionised martyrs with songs, poems and shrines, pictured 
martyrs on posters adorned with passages from the Qur'an, glorified suicide attacks as 
the epitome of martyrdom, and published books detailing the exploits of leading 
fighters killed in battle, thereby stressing their religious motivation and their reward in 
heaven (Ranstorp: 1996: 51). 
Not only does the emphasis on the religious nature of the conflict provide justification 
for the use of violence, it also situates the conflict as an "unbridgeable dichotomy 
between two absolutes" - the religion of Islam and that of Judaism (Litvak: 1998: 
159). In perceiving the conflict in this way, a zero-sum outcome seems to be the only 
possibility, where one identity group's gain is the other's loss, and where the 
continued survival of one threatens the survival of the other. 
Ranstorp (1996: 57) notes that the use and sanctioning of religious violence requires a 
clearly defined enemy. The definition of the enemy by an identity group, and the 
decision to use religious violence against it, is dependent on, and shaped by, the 
degree of the sense of crisis threatening the faith and community of that group. This is 
generally shaped by a historical legacy of repression, economic inequality or social 
upheaval (Ranstorp: 1996: 57). 
According to Fisher (1990: 108), high intensity conflict is created when groups are 
placed so that the existence of one appears to threaten the existence of the other, and 
this is particularly important where identities are fused with overlapping territory. In 
the Palestinian case, then, the creation of Israel was perceived as a threat to the 
identity and security of the Palestinian people. The conflict has become further 
protracted by virtue of the fact that the perception exists that recognition of one group 
appears to deny the legitimacy of the other. The intergroup discrimination that is 
required by identity groups for the establishment of a positive self-identity results in 
the de-humanisation of the other - a result that has serious implications for the 
legitimation of violence against the other identity group. 
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According to social identity theory, one attempts to enhance self-esteem through 
positive comparisons with other groups, where self-esteem is enhanced by perceptions 
of one's group being distinct and different from, and better than, other groups (Cottam 
& Cottam: 2001: 89). This does, however, lead to stereotyping, discrimination and in-
group favouritism. As Ranstorp (1996: 54) argues, religious nationalist groups 
refer to their alien or secular enemies in dehumanising terms which may loosen 
the moral constraints for them in their employment of particularly destructive 
acts of terrorism. 
According to J abri (1996: 127) the implications of categorisation of self and other are 
central to understanding processes that legitimate violence. Stereotypical images of 
the enemy are intricately linked to the dehumanisation of the other, and this 
legitimates violent behaviour as, in foreswearing the humanity of the opposition, acts 
of terror are legitimised (Halliday: 2000: 83). So, 
an enemy stereotypified as diabolical and inferior is, as a consequence, presented 
by a leadership of a conflict party as a legitimate target of direct violence or of 
discrimination (Jabri: 1996: 127). 
The result is that the enemy is presented as a monolithic whole, where both 
population and leadership are portrayed as one deserving target (Jabri: 1996: 127). 
Furthermore, Juergensmeyer (1996: 13) argues that, where politics is seen in a 
religious manner, and where political problems are perceived to have religious causes, 
the enemy is usually identified in religious terms, either as a religious foe, or as 
irreligion - a force opposed to religion. 
Litvak argues that "every national movement defines itself in opposition to some 
'other'" (ht!p://www.dayan.org/d&a-hamas-litvak.htm). In addition, the depiction and 
definition of the other, usually a negative one, reflects the perception of the self. Thus, 
where the PLO depicts the conflict as one between Palestinians and Zionists, Hamas 
views it as one between Islanl and Judaism, or between Muslims and Jews. Hamas' 
emphasis on the religious essence of the conflict, leads to the perception that the 
conflict is one "between good personified by the Muslims who represent the party of 
God against 'evil incarnated,' 'the party of Satan' represented by the Jews" (Litvak: 
1998: 150). While the Palestinians are depicted by Hamas as "a living people, creative 
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with unrivalled honour and generosity' (Hamas Charter in Litvak: 1998: 151), Jews 
are portrayed in demonic terms, as 'blood suckers' and 'butchers' who do not 
recognise honour and generosity outside their group (Litvak: 1998: 151). As such, 
acts of violence against Israelis and Jews are legitimised by the demonisation of that 
group of people. 
In addition to identity stereotyping, conflict may also be exacerbated by a sense of 
victimisation. According to Searle-White (2001: 91), the perception of victimisation 
of an identity group serves to fuel conflict situations as it confers a moral authority, 
where actions may be taken against an enemy while still blaming them for the 
violence. Furthermore, "the egoism of victimisation" provides a moral legitimacy for 
continued stnlggle (Searle-White: 2001: 93). The consequence of the emphasis on 
victimisation is that of retribution and revenge, where an identity group seeks to right 
the psychological aspects of the injury by attaining recognition of the wrong by the 
aggressor, and by changing the aggressor's evaluation of the aggrieved (Searle-White: 
2001: 95). Thus, because we evaluate ourselves in relation to others, things like 
'honour' and 'pride' become synonymous with how we evaluate ourselves, and how 
we believe that others evaluate us. As such, when an identity group is aggrieved, it 
appears necessary to undertake retributive action or revenge in order to protect the 
integrity of that identity (Searle-White: 2001: 96). Thus, 
if we experience an injury to our people, and we decide not to respond or take 
revenge, we might be accused of not being sufficiently patriotic or nationalist 
(Searle-White: 2001: 97). 
Similarly, Humphries (2001: 47 - 48) argues that in a political discourse framed by a 
sense of victimisation, one gains rights by virtue of having been a victim. Because 
being a victim involves a sense of violation, powerlessness and humiliation, the 
victim needs to feel whole again, and it is this need that impels demands for violent 
action. The central problem with the sense of victimisation in conflict is that acts of 
violence by members of one community against another generate a counter-reaction, 
and produces a hatred that may undermine co-existence between two communities 
(Halliday: 2000: 81). 
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The sense of Palestinian victimisation is apparent in Islamist arguments that, since the 
establislunent of the state ofIsrael, 
the Zionist enemy speaks only the language of weapons and the methods of 
manoeuvring and deception in order to achieve its wishes for expansion. Against 
all this the Muslim nation has been divided into two groups: one was the group 
of governments and regimes that followed the enemy by dialogue and talks that 
brought us only harm and the loss of rights. The other, the group of the peoples 
led by the Jihadi movements, has understood the lesson from the beginning, and 
has identified the nature and the language of the enemy. They sacrificed both 
soul and fortune for the defence of Arabic and Islamic rights (Tala't Muslim in 
Paz: http://www.ict.org.iVarticles/articiedet.dfm?articleid=407). 
Both Israelis and Palestinians consider themselves victims of the other in the conflict, 
and this becomes apparent in the endless cycle of retributive attacks. So, for example, 
after the Hebron massacre of 1994, a West Bank Palestinian rammed a care full of 
explosives into a crowded bus station in the Israeli town of 'Afula, killing eight and 
wounding forty others. This "revenge" for Hebron was supported by the population of 
the Occupied Territories (Usher: 1997: 343). In return, Israel closed off the West 
Bank and Gaza, rounded up hundreds of Hamas "suspects" and launched punitive 
raids against Palestinians in order to uncover "Muslim extremists." This, in turn, 
chipped away at the support of the PLO, and lent increased credibility to Hamas 
(Usher: 1997: 344). This, then, is the central problem with regard to the Palestinian 
sense of victimisation - the repression that results from each attack by Hamas on 
Israel, lends more legitimacy and credence to continued terrorist activity. 
Threats to a group identity operate at both an individual and group level. When an 
identity group is threatened, the individual members of that group feel threatened as a 
result of the fact that membership of that group is supportive of their individual self-
esteem (Fisher: 1990: 104). A threat to the identity of a group is likely to enhance the 
potential for group conflict as this increases in-group identification and cohesion. 
The religious overtones of the IsraellPalestine conflict have resulted in the perception 
that the Islamic identity is under threat. The Islamisation of Palestinian identity by 
Hamas has largely contributed to the cohesion of this identity group, where 
stereotyping and victimisation exacerbates the conflict, while the sanctification of 
violence by religion provides justification for continued struggle in the name of 
Islamic identity. Furthermore, the conclusion that one may draw from this is that, as 
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the Hamas Charter states, any negotiation with the enemy is a "concession of 
principle, and granting recognition to murderers and usurpers on rights which are not 
theirs over land in which they had not been born" (Litvak: 1998: 154). 
IV 
The rise and popularity of Islamist movements in Palestine impact greatly on attempts 
to settle the conflict in that region. Of particular interest to this thesis is the effect that 
these groups have had on the Declaration ofPrincipies, or Oslo Accords, of 1993. 
The Oslo process was conducted in secret between representatives of the Israeli 
government and the PLO. While the specificities of the negotiation process will be 
dealt with in the next chapter, I will briefly layout the major decisions of the 
Declaration here: the Oslo Accords presented a gradual plan for Palestinian 
autonomy, where interim negotiations resulted in the decision that Israel would 
withdraw from Jericho and Gaza; a Palestinian National Authority (PNA) would be 
nominated; and the people of Palestine would be granted a five-year transitional 
period of Palestinian self-rule under the PNA. 
The extreme exclusivity of the Oslo negotiation process made the Accord difficult to 
legitimise and implement in Israeli and Palestinian societies. As only a handful of 
people knew about the Declaration of Principles prior to its publication, many parties 
- both Israeli and Palestinian - felt excluded, and the consequences of this, particularly 
in terms of the exclusion of both Jewish and Islamic religious groupings had serious 
implications for the successful implementation of the Accord (Dale: 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.zaltwo/3/p25.htrnl). 
According to Dale (http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.zaltwo/3/p25.htrnl), the frame for the Oslo 
channel was comprised of discussions about economic development and peace in the 
Middle East. However, both the PLO and the Israeli Labour Party government were 
secular actors who focussed on the importance of the economic dimension in their 
analysis of the Palestinian conflict. Critics of the Accord claimed that the secular 
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participants failed to develop corresponding religious arguments in order to legitimise 
their policies. 
Due to the fact that no strategy was developed to include a religious dimension of the 
process in order to engage new political groupings in the process, "the initiative to 
interpret the Accord and the process in religious terms has in this way been left to 
actors and parties excluded from the process" (Dale: 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.zaitwo/3/p25.html). The exclusion of a religious dimension in 
the Oslo process has resulted in extremist groups justifying terrorist attacks by 
reference to irreconcilable religious interpretations of the Accord, rather than the 
emergence of a religious platform supporting the process. 
According to Miall, Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1998: 175 - 176), despite the fact 
that both the Israelis and the Palestinians had come a long way in recognising each 
other, the agreement was unequal from a Palestinian perspective, and thus only viable 
as an interim agreement. The Palestinian Interim Self-Governing Authority (PISG) 
had no authority over Israeli settlements, external relations, resident rights or lines of 
communication between the autonomous enclaves that the Palestinians had been 
granted. Further, "future status" issues - the right of return of Palestinian refugees, the 
future borders of the Palestinian entity, the future of settlements in occupied 
territories, and the question of Jerusalem - had been deferred (Miall et al: 1998: 175). 
Differences between the parties arose immediately, and extremist groups on both 
sides carried out attacks directed at the peace process - including the Hebron massacre 
and Hamas suicide bombings. The result of these militant actions was a sharp fall in 
living standards in the occupied territories, and the economic cooperation on which 
the Oslo Accord was based was undermined (Miall et al: 1998: 176). While right-
wing Jews committed a number of attacks, and Jewish settlers built more settlements 
in the occupied territories in order to undermine the land-for-peace deal, Palestinians 
felt that the Accord gave too little to the Palestinians. As such, Hamas 
took those criticisms to the streets in a wave of bombings and other attacks that 
undermined Israeli support for the peace process (Hauss: 2001: 150). 
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Since the signing of the Oslo Accord, Hamas has made use of tactics of guerrilla 
warfare. Its aim, according to Usher (1997: 343) has been not so much to ruin the 
Declaration of Principles, but to delay their implementation in order for the PLO to 
lose legitimacy and support. Further, because Arafat's legitimacy and authority 
hinged on his ability to be seen to visibly deliver peace, any escalation in violence 
would reflect negatively on his leadership, and on the PLO (Wallace: 1993: 32). To 
this end, Hamas pursued various terror tactics: ambushing the Israeli Defence Force's 
coordinator of undercover movements; the killing of No'am Cohen (a General 
Security Service operative); and a retaliation to the Hebron massacre in February 
1994, by ramming of a car full of explosives into a crowded Israeli bus station 
(Usher: 1997: 343). 
The problem that arose for Arafat was that he was powerless to control Hamas, as the 
Palestinian police force had yet to be set up. Further, the Oslo Accord stated that 
Israel would be responsible for "external" security - i.e. for Israel and the Israelis -
while the Palestinian Authority would be responsible for "internal security" (Usher: 
1997: 344). This meant that, in order to safeguard the people of Israel, Rabin was 
pushed on numerous occasions to using collective sanctions against the Palestinians -
a move that strengthened Hamas in the people's eyes due to its rejection of Israel, 
where the PLO was seen to harbour a conciliatory attitude to that country (Usher: 
1997: 344). 
While the armed struggle of Hamas resulted in a loss of credibility on the part of the 
PLO and Arafat, it has hampered the peace process and thus hampered the attainment 
of Palestinian autonomy and self-rule. The number of Israelis killed in the thirty 
months after the signing of the Accord - 213 - was greater than that of the preceding 
decade - 203 from January 1983 to September 1993 (Falk & Schwartz: 
http://www.ict.org.il/articles/articledet.cfm?articleid=434). In order to fulfil its 
mandate of the protection of Israeli citizens, Israel redeployed into the Gaza Strip in 
1994 and into the West Bank in 1995 and 1996, at the expense of Palestinian land, 
autonomy, freedom of movement, and water resources (Hass : 
http://www.guardian.co. ukiPrintlO,3 858,4071 052,00 .html). 
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As of June, 1994, the Palestinian Authority took over responsibility for the repression 
of militant groups, and in November, for the first time, the P A's police force opened 
fire on Hamas demonstrators outside the Grand Mosque in Gaza, killing 16 people 
(Keppel: 2002: 329). This incident, together with the fact that Israel set up roadblocks 
and control points, along with travel bans in the West Bank and along the Gaza 
frontier, making life impossible for the average Palestinian, lost the PLO much-
needed public support (Keppel: 2002: 329). Hamas stepped up it's campaign of 
violence and suicide attacks within Israel, using violence to block the implementation 
of the Accord in order to wring further concessions from Israel. 
It was with this long term hope in mind that the Palestinian popUlation could 
tolerate violence, given the immediate price it had to pay in the form of Israeli 
retaliation and a dramatic fall in living standards (Keppel: 2002: 330). 
According to Dale (http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/3/p2S.html), the final status 
negotiations when Peres and the Labour Party were still in power were brought to an 
immediate halt by Israeli reactions to suicide bombings by Islamist movements in 
February and March 1996. Further, the subsequent election and installation of the 
right-wing Netanyahu government - who openly denounced the Oslo Accord 
worsened the climate for continuing the process, which later ground to a halt. 
Under Netanyahu's Israeli government, a harder line was taken with regard to Hamas 
attacks. Israel's borders with the territories were closed, leading to the economic 
strangulation of Palestinians, Israel's gradual withdrawal from the West Bank was 
gradually halted, and the number of Jewish settlements in the occupied territories 
increased. The political influence of terror tactics against Israel lost its appeal to a 
Palestinian popUlation "exhausted and demoralised by this never-ending struggle" 
(Keppel: 2002: 331). 
The second intifada - the "al-Aqsa intifada" - took place as the Oslo peace process 
reached a stalemate. Despite the fact that Arafat hoped that the increase in violence 
would be of political currency for the nationalist movement, he steadily lost ground to 
Islamists. Suicide bombers have become the main symbol of this intifada, becoming 
heroes of the Palestinian youth. Furthermore, the events of September 11 have 
provided Israel with an incentive to use unrestricted force in this "war on terror," 
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while Islamist radicals have again embarked of a fresh cycle of suicide bombings 
(Keppel: 2002: 333 - 334). 
According to Rubinstein (in Usher: 1997: 344), after Oslo, 
Hamas's terrorist activities contain two main political messages. The first - to 
< Arafat and the PLO - is do not dare ignore us; the second - to the state ofIsrae1 
- is that negotiations with the PLO do not constitute the final word and that 
Hamas must also be taken into account. 
Ultimately, Hamas still holds a relatively powerful position in the Palestinian political 
landscape. It has retained the ability to mobilise the people of Palestine, to influence 
policies in the region, and to undermine the peace process. While it must be noted 
that there is no necessary link between the religion of Islam and acts of terror, the 
general trend of identifying Islam and terrorism serves to delegitimise the actions of 
groups who mobilise Muslims (Halliday: 2000: 80). According to Halliday (2000: 86 
- 87), the moral guideline to be considered when a group commits acts of terror is that 
these acts must be separated from the justice of the cause, as "the act no more 
disqualifies the cause than the cause justifies the act." 
v 
The religious "terrorism" of organisations like Hamas, while succeeding in mobilising 
support, results not only in increasingly oppressive state measures to counteract 
violence, but also ensures that the voice of the people that they represent is effectively 
excluded from any kind of negotiated settlement. In short, the violent actions that 
Hamas has undertaken are counterproductive in terms of the reasons underscoring 
their support in the first place. The resort to violence and acts of terror by Islamist 
movements discredits the cause that they uphold in the eyes of both the international 
community and the central negotiating partners. The popularity of these movements, 
and the support that they enjoy is the result of a need for identity recognition, but the 
actions that they undertake ensure that these are excluded from a negotiated 
settlement. Thus the identity and recognition needs of Islarnist supporters, while they 
may be met in terms of belonging to an Islamic identity group, are not met or 
recognised by other parties in the conflict. And if the identity group is the primary 
unit for ensuring the gratification of other needs, then the Islamic people of 
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Palestine's pnmary identity group for ensuring need-satisfaction IS proving to be 
ineffectual. 
The IsraelilPalestinian conflict is one where discrimination between identity groups 
has led to a situation of protracted social conflict, where needs of recognition of the 
other are not met, and where the denial of the humanity of the other has resulted in the 
deprivation of other basic needs. Ranstorp (1996: 62) argues that one should not treat 
religious forces in global politics as single, monolithic entities, 
but rather seek to understand the inner logic of these individual groups and the 
mechanisms that produce terrorism in order to undermine their breeding ground 
and strength. 
In order to attain greater understanding between the parties in the conflict, then , and 
in order to maintain the focus on conflict as the result of needs-deprivation, the next 
chapter considers the problem-solving approach to negotiation in order to detennine 
whether greater recognition between the opposing groups could open the path to 
dialogue and thus take an initial step toward settlement. 
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Chapter 3 
"Not only do ... identity groups constitute a bindingforce that brings individuals into 
social relationships, those groups can also be the locus of conflict behaviour in world 
society. " 
- Burton, J. (1988: 192) 
Conventional, or traditional means of conflict resolution have largely focussed on 
conflict settlement rather than on real resolution of conflict situations. The reason for 
this, according to De Reuk (1990: 185), is that conventional means of negotiation 
involve a bargaining process aimed at trading losses, and only result in a temporary 
accommodation representing the smallest concessions that parties to a conflict are 
prepared to make. Further, the zero-sum nature of traditional means of resolution 
results in a situation where one party' s loss is the other's gain, and this precludes 
resolution. The fact that parties to a conflict generally have mutually exclusive frames 
of reference and that these preclude co-operation, as collaboration is perceived to 
equate to disloyalty, further hampers the possibility of true resolution (De Reuk: 1990: 
186). 
Burton (1988: 192) argues that two phenomena affect traditional negotiation methods. 
First, traditional negotiation does not take account of values and human aspirations 
that are not subjected to societal control. Second, no responsible leader is in a position 
to hand control over to a third party as a means of settlement. Further, traditional 
processes have failed due to the fact that, where important values are at stake, 
compromises may prove impossible to implement, and power bargaining, rather than 
resolving conflict, may result in its escalation (Burton: 1988: 188). 
Conventional wisdom on conflict resolution perceives conflict only in terms of 
negotiable interests that may be bargained, altered or traded (Burton: 1988: 194). 
According to this, conflict over interests is zero-sum, and individuals may be 
socialised or coerced into accepting certain social norms and means as a method to 
settle disputes . Both theory and application reveal that protracted conflicts are 
generally over both substantive or objective interests, and subjective or non-
negotiable needs and values. The problem that SUbjective issues poses to negotiation 
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is that these relate to human and identity needs, and individuals cannot be socialised 
into behaving counter to their security, identity and other needs as "there are needs of 
individual development and control that will be pursued, regardless of consequences" 
(Burton: 1988: 193 - 194). 
As conflict is reconceptualised, Burton (1988: 188) argues that there is a move from 
the more traditional power politics of bargaining and settlement to a new theory of 
problem-solving that takes non-negotiable needs and values into account. Thus, 
Human Needs theorists do not focus on the settlement of conflict only by means of 
legal or power norms, but rather through an analysis of the nature of the conflict, and 
through a reconceptualisation of the conflict by the parties concerned, in order to 
resolve it. 
The point here is not that traditional methods of conflict resolution are completely 
without success, but rather that, in the resolution and de-escalation of conflicts that 
involve both objective and subjective issues, one needs to determine which method is 
most suited to either resolving a conflict, or preparing the ground for future 
negotiations, at a given time. 
This chapter proposes to begin by exammmg the vanous methods of third-party 
intervention in conflict situations, with particular emphasis on the problem-solving or 
consultation process of negotiation. The second section of this chapter will examine 
the stages of conflict escalation and the corresponding third-party interventions that 
will be most likely to succeed in managing or resolving the conflict. In particular, this 
section will show how the success of third-party interventions in situations of 
protracted social conflict is often contingent on the success of the problem-solving 
approach. Thirdly, this chapter will examine the process of the Oslo Accords as a 
method of consultation, or problem-solving, while the fourth section will consider 
whether the failure of this approach was largely determined by the fact that it failed to 
deal with the subjective issues necessary for continued negotiation. 
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In order to understand the importance of the problem-solving or consultation approach 
to negotiations, it is best to begin by briefly describing the more traditional 
approaches to third-party involvement in conflict resolution and management. 
According to Fisher and Keashly (1991: 33), conciliation involves a third party 
providing a communication link between antagonists in order to identify the major 
issues of the conflict. Furthermore, the third party is charged with lowering the 
tension between the antagonists and encouraging a move toward direct interaction in 
order to settle differences. 
Mediation refers to the involvement of an intermediary who facilitates a negotiated 
settlement on a set of specific substantive or objective issues (Fisher & Keashly: 
1991: 33). The mediation process may include meetings with individual groups and 
joint negotiating sessions, and makes use of reason, persuasion and the suggestion of 
alternatives in order to assist the antagonists in finding an agreement acceptable to 
both parties. 
In contrast, what Fisher and Keashly (1991: 33) refer to as "mediation with muscle," 
or "power mediation," builds on the function of mediation, but makes use of leverage 
or coercion by the third party in the form of promised rewards or threatened 
punishments. As such, the third party becomes part of a negotiating triad, bargaining 
with each party in order to move them towards a settlement. 
In arbitration, the third party provides a binding judgement to the parties by 
considering the merits of the opposing positions and imposing a settlement that is 
deemed to be fair and just (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 33). 
While these traditional methods of third party intervention may prove useful at certain 
points in a conflict, they tend to sideline SUbj ective issues in their analysis of 
conflicting positions. In contrast, problem-solving, or consultation, attempts to 
"confront the opposing perceptions and attitudes and to reveal the underlying 
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emotional and relationship issues" in a given conflict situation (Fisher & Keashly: 
1991: 33). This does not deny that objective issues - real conflicts of interest in terms 
of resource scarcity, territory and the like - are not of great importance in intergroup 
conflict, but notes that 
once a conflict is initiated, the perceptions, attitudes and interaction of the parties 
become crucial elements in determining its further course (Fisher & Keashly: 
1991 : 32). 
At issue here, then, is the fact that sUbjective elements increase and take on added 
significance in conflict situations. In addition, while any agreement on objective, or 
substantive issues may constitute a short- or medium-term settlement, "for long term 
resolution to occur both objective and subjective elements must be addressed" (Fisher 
& Keashly: 1991: 34). 
Jabri (1996: 153) argues that traditional means of negotiation that have outcomes 
based on coercion preclude the possibility of resolution of the underlying causes of 
conflict in a way that facilitated, interactive communication does not. Interactive 
communication through the problem-solving approach, rather, aims at understanding 
and mutual recognition between parties as a basis for more lasting, mutually 
reinforcing outcomes. In short, 
while traditional, coercive mediation may achieve settlement of issues, it cannot 
produce resolution of the fundamental causes of protracted conflicts centred 
around identity and security concerns (Jabri: 1996: 153). 
Problem-solving negotiation is not only focussed on the cessation of hostilities, but 
places an emphasis on constructive and interactive co-operation between conflicting 
parties. The problem-solving approach to negotiations aims at resolving the blocks 
that traditional approaches pose to the search for constructive outcomes in conflict 
situations by assisting parties to redefine their situations so that the conflict is 
perceived as a shared predicament (De Reuk: 1990: 186). 
The approach rests on facilitating the creation of conditions that will make a certain 
kind of interaction between parties possible. Parties to a conflict are placed in a 
position where they act as analysts of the conflict, explore mutual perspectives and 
generate new ideas in a joint problem-solving, or workshop approach. The purpose of 
the interaction is to create products - new ideas, knowledge, attitudes and perceptions 
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- that make for innovative resolution proposals to feed into policy in order to redefine 
or transcend the conflict so a positive-sum outcome may be explored (Kelman: 1990: 
200 - 201). The central aim of the approach is to bring representatives of the conflict 
together in a 
series of infonnal and flexible small group discussions, not unlike academic 
seminars, in a neutral and supportive atmosphere (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 32). 
These workshops aim to serve the dual purpose of producing a change in the 
participants' understanding, perceptions and attitudes, and to transfer these changes 
into the policy arena, thus serving both an educational and a political purpose 
(Kelman: 1990: 203). 
Problem-solving, then, emphasises mutual understanding between the protagonists of 
conflict in order to detennine if outcomes other than violence are possible. The aims 
of the problem-solving approach, according to Rothman (in Jabri: 1996: 155), include: 
1. Mutual recognition between parties, and legitimate participation in the process 
of communication. 
2. Parties gaining insight into the central concerns, fears and position of the 
adversary as well as an understanding of the attitudinal and structural 
constraints that the parties operate under. 
3. A gradual recognition of changes in the attitudes and positions of the 
adversary, as well as potential openings for peace signals. 
4. Within the workshop environment, participants gain an understanding of the 
actions that they can adopt that would not only be meaningful to the other side, 
but that would also entail little cost to themselves. 
In short, problem-solving emphasises not only a mutual understanding of the position 
of self and adversary, and the constraints which limit manoeuvrability of the parties, 
but also of the process of the negotiation rather than the outcome - a process that 
precludes manipulation and coercion (Jabri: 1996: 154). 
Burton (1990: 202) argues that problem-solving has four distinctive characteristics. 
Firstly, it must be noted that the solution is not an end product as it establishes a new 
set of relationships that contains its own set of problems. As such, it is to be seen as a 
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continuing process that complements other negotiation methods, rather than a final 
determination of outcomes. 
Secondly, as noted earlier, problem-solving requires a synthesis of new knowledge 
and new techniques and thus results in a change in the conceptualisation of the 
problem at hand. Thirdly, it is necessary that problem-solving deals with a situation in 
its complete environment and, as such, needs to take cognisance not only of the 
immediate issue at hand, but also of the impact of the greater environment. Finally, in 
order to be effective, problem-solving needs to go back to the sources and origins of 
the conflict. As Burton (1990: 203) argues, 
when we witness the eruption of a conflict we are inclined to attribute it to some 
immediate causal factor, and find difficulty in justifying the response by 
reference to the apparent stimulus that triggered it. We fail to place the stimulus 
and the response in the total causal setting. 
Problem-solving, then, focuses on the breaking down of conflict situations into 
parties and issues, and creating the opportunity for face-to-face interaction between 
representatives of the parties to a conflict (Burton: 1990: 143). Further, the approach 
makes use of a facilitator or panel of facilitators to assist dialogue between the parties 
in analytical workshops. The primary activity engaged in by the parties is analysis -
an exchange designed to reveal positions, frustrations, constraints and perceptions, 
and through this analysis parties are led to discover options. The analytical thrust of 
the process negates the relevance of power in the negotiation process, as it is, in 
essence, a process of informed decision-making. 
The role of the third party in the process is to help participants accurately define their 
negotiable interests, and their non-negotiable needs and values. As such, the role of 
the third party is seen to be mostly facilitative and diagnostic, but is also non-
evaluative, non-directive and non-coercive. The main aim of the facilitator(s) is to 
"further the parties ' analysis and use their social skills to facilitate the problem-
solving process" (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 32). The third party assists the parties in 
discovering options that are acceptable in terms oftheir interests and that satisfy their 
needs (Burton: 1990: 143). The facilitator thus induces mutual motivation for 
problem-solving, improves the openness and accuracy of communication, diagnoses 
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the processes and issues, and regulates interaction between the antagonists (Fisher & 
Keashly: 1991: 32). 
Once participants have articulated the basic needs that need to be satisfied, they begin 
to explore possible solutions that will be responsive to the needs and fears of both 
sides. This, then, moves the process to a point where the participants can discuss the 
psychological and political barriers that need to be overcome in order to put such 
solutions in place, and how each side may help the other in the effort to change 
psychological and political barriers to resolution. 
In terms of human needs, Kelman (1990: 289) argues that three inter-related aspects 
of the problem-solving approach, namely the definition of the enterprise, the structure 
of the workshops, and the workshop process, are important. In short, the problem-
solving enterprise is "defined as an effort to find - through joint, creative problem 
solving - solutions to the conflict that would satisfy the needs of both parties (Kelman: 
1990: 289). The problem-solving workshops are thus structured so that their focus is 
on the needs that are at the core of the conflict, and are geared to allow the parties to 
identify and understand each other's needs and thus take both sets of needs into 
account. 
In terms of the definition of the enterprise, the central element is finding a solution 
that would satisfy the needs of all parties to the conflict. Thus the task of the 
workshop is to restructure the conflict in order to allow for a positive-sum outcome. 
Thus, by focussing on needs like identity and security, problem-solving assists the 
parties in redefining the conflict in a way that may make it susceptible to a solution 
satisfactory to all parties. And, once the existential concerns of the parties have been 
addressed, issues of redistributive bargaining over territory and resources may be 
undertaken. 
There are three major implications for the structure of the workshops in a negotiating 
context where human needs are at the core of the resolution process. First, individuals 
participating in the workshops are those who are most directly and immediately 
involved in the conflict (Kelman: 1990: 292). While this does not deny that other 
parties are involved in the greater conflict arena, the starting point to the resolution 
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process must be a direct interaction between those parties most immediately involved 
in the conflict. While, ultimately, agreements must be reached at an official level and 
fed into the official policy process, bilateral, unofficial problem-solving workshops 
provide the base for this, later, policy (Kelman: 1990: 293). 
Secondly, Kelman (1990: 293) argues that 
in focussing on the parties most immediately involved in the conflict, we make 
the assumption that enduring, high-quality solutions, that are responsive to the 
parties ' needs, cannot be imposed. 
These solutions, rather, emerge out of the direct interaction of the parties, where the 
workshops are structured so that the interaction necessary for the satisfaction of the 
needs of both parties becomes necessary and possible. This can only take place in a 
situation where the interaction of the parties focuses on each other, with the goal of 
understanding the concerns and constraints on the other's perspective. 
Finally, unlike traditional negotiation methods where power imbalances affect the 
outcome of the resolution processes (Burton: 1988 : 190), Kelman (1990: 293) argues 
that the workshops must be structured on the basis of equality in order to assure that 
the parties' needs may each be satisfied without violating the needs of the other. 
Without the structure of the workshops ensuring the equality of parties, it is likely that 
the discussions will yield resolutions that are only responsive to the needs of one of 
the parties, thus not resolving the conflict, but only temporarily settling it. 
The workshop process should be designed in such a manner that the parties are able to 
identify and understand each other's needs, and take both sets of needs into account as 
they arrive at an overall solution (Kelman: 1990: 295). As such, it is important that 
workshops begin with an exploration of the parties' needs and concerns in order to 
ensure that these needs are understood by the parties to the conflict. More specifically, 
the focus of the discussion must centre on collective needs, as 
people pursue satisfaction of their needs through collective entities - particularly 
through 'identity groups' at the national , subnational, and transnational level 
(Kelman: 1990: 296). 
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There are two reasons for the focus on collective needs and identity groups. First, 
identity groups serve as vehicles for the satisfaction of basic needs of their members 
(for security, self-development, self-expression and personal identity), and second, 
in view of members' identification with these groups, the status of the groups is 
itself a source of the members' personal identity, self-esteem, and sense of 
dignity and meaning (Kelman: 1990: 296). 
The problem-solving approach, then, unlike traditional zero-sum bargaining over 
interests, incorporates the aspect of human needs into the negotiation process in order 
to ensure that the root causes of conflict are addressed, rather than focussing solely on 
the manifestations of needs-deprivation. 
II 
Kelman (1990: 213) notes that the consultation, or problem-solving process should 
not necessarily be viewed as a substitute for other forms of negotiation, but rather as 
preparing the way for, supplementing and feeding into official negotiations. Due to 
the fact that these workshops may provide a unique input into conflict resolution by 
creating an atmosphere conducive to negotiation, or establishing an appropriate 
framework for parties that are ready for communication but not for official 
negotiations, or by "allowing parties to work out pieces of a solution that can then be 
fed into the formal negotiation process" (Kelman: 1990: 213). These workshops may 
be useful, then, at various phases in the negotiation process. 
Similarly, Fisher and Keashly (1991: 30) argue that consultation complements the 
mediation process to the extent that problem-solving 
might be used to analyse and de-escalate need and interest conflicts to the point 
where mediation of interests would more likely be successful (Fisher & Keashly: 
1991: 30). 
In order to determine at which points in conflict resolution the consultation process 
would be effective, one needs to examine the escalation process of conflict, and the 
corresponding methods of resolution. 
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Fisher and Keashly (1991: 35) have developed a stage model of conflict escalation, 
where four stages of escalation occur, namely: (I) Discussion; (2) Polarization; (3) 
Segregation; and (4) Destruction, These four stages are distinguished by 
changes in the nature of communication between the parties, their perceptions 
and images of each other and their relationship, the overt issues at the fore of the 
dispute, the perceived possible outcomes and the preferred strategy for handling 
the conflict (Fisher & Keashly: 100 I: 35), 
Stage one of conflict escalation is characterised by relatively good communication, 
where the parties engage each other in debate and discussion, and where each party 
has a relatively accurate, or at least a benign, perception of the other. Concurrently, 
the relationship between the parties begins as one of trust, respect and commitment. 
The issues fuelling the conflict in this first stage are those substantive issues and their 
related positions that highlight a conflict of interests between the parties, Initial 
perceived outcomes include a joint-gain, or positive-sum result from negotiations that 
involve joint decision-making (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 35 - 36), 
As the conflict escalates, these characteristics change in the second stage of conflict 
escalation, Communication in this second stage has diminished to the point were 
parties rely on interpretation (and often misinterpretation) of actions and events, and 
less direct communication is evident than in the first stage, Corresponding with this 
change, parties begin to perceive each other through rigid and negative stereotyping, 
While each party still considers the other as important in its own right, concerns about 
the relationship between the parties dominate the issues table, Outcomes in the second 
stage, unlike those of the first stage are concerned with mutual compromise rather 
than joint-gain, and negotiation takes the place of joint decision-making as the parties' 
preferred strategy for resolution (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 35 - 36), 
The use of threats as a means of communication between parties becomes evident in 
the third stage of conflict escalation where each party perceives the conflict as one 
between "good" and "evil" due to the mistrust and disrespect characterising the 
relationship, Issues of fundamental needs or core values such as identity and security 
are increasingly emphasised in this stage of the conflict, and parties perceive a win-
lose outcome to the conflict, thus preferring a strategy of defensive competition to one 
of negotiation or joint decision-making (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 35 - 36), 
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The final stage of conflict escalation is characterised by a complete absence of direct 
communication and attacks of violence, In this stage perceptions of the other have 
deteriorated to the extent that the other is portrayed in non-human terms, and each 
party perceives an improvement in the relationship to be impossible, The central issue 
at this point is the question of ultimate survival of both parties and, as a result, parties 
perceive that lose-lose outcomes are the most likely to ensue, As such, each party 
attempts to minimise its losses while maximising costs to the enemy, and thus prefers 
the strategy of attempting outright destruction of the adversary (Fisher & Keashly: 
1991: 35 - 36), 
While this is a relatively simplified version of the conflict escalation process, it is 
apparent that differing methods of resolution and de-escalation are required at 
different points in the conflict The point of conflict resolution is to de-escalate the 
conflict back through the stages mentioned above in order to reach some form of 
settlement and resolution, 
Due to the fact that the central issues in the conflict are substantive in the first stage, 
and both parties believe that joint gain is possible, it is necessary to ensure that 
communication between the parties remains of high quality, For this reason, 
conciliation is best suited to stage one conflict, as it facilitates clear and open 
communication of interests and related positions, thereby opening the way for direct 
negotiations in order to settle the dispute before any damage is done to the 
relationship between the parties (Fisher & Keashly: 1991 : 36), 
Because trust and respect are threatened and distorted perceptions and simplified 
negative stereotypes emerge in the second stage, the relationship between the parties 
becomes of central concern to third party intervention, Consultation becomes of 
central importance, as it is most appropriate in terms of dealing with sUbjective issues 
like mistrust, distorted perceptions and negative attitudes (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 
36), The substantive issues of the conflict can only be addressed once a cooperative 
relationship is established or re-established between the parties, and consultation thus 
provides the grounding for direct negotiations in this stage of the conflict 
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The third stage of conflict escalation is characterised by defensive competition and 
hostility, and the conflict is perceived to threaten basic needs, such as identity and 
security. While it is necessary to halt the spiral through some means of immediate 
control, like arbitration or power mediation, this is most likely to be successful if it is 
complemented by a process of consultation. Consultation, in addition to more 
coercive methods, may be used to improve the relationship between the adversaries so 
that the substantive issues may be dealt with either through stage two mediation, or 
through the direct negotiation of stage one (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 38 - 39). 
Consultation, then, allows for a focus on the subjective issues of the conflict 
rather than assuming that settlement of the substantive issues will by itself 
improve the relationship between the parties (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 39). 
The nature of fourth stage conflict escalation makes it more difficult to de-escalate, 
and peacekeeping may be required as a means of minimising the losses of both 
adversaries. While this includes processes of mediation and arbitration, in order to 
stabilise the relationship between the adversaries, the consultation process, as in stage 
three, is used to provide a full analysis of the conflict and its escalation, and to 
identify the key elements and issues in the conflict, some of which may be solved by 
pure mediation, and others by continued consultation (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 39). 
The point here is that consultation makes an important contribution to the conflict 
resolution process due to its focus on the subjective issues of the conflict and the 
perceptions of, and relations between, the adversaries. Consultation, then, has a useful 
role to play in pre-negotiation and pre-mediation, where parties are encouraged to 
jointly articulate their underlying concerns along with the substantive issues present in 
order to move toward a shared definition and analysis of the conflict. Fisher and 
Keashly (1991: 38) note that one of the primary reasons for the failure of mediation 
and negotiation is that 
the relationship between parties has deteriorated significantly, interests are often 
interfused with needs and appear non-negotiable, and the respective positions 
have become intransigent through a series of past commitments (Fisher & 
Keashly: 1991: 38). 
The utilisation of the consultation process, in contrast, facilitates the improvement of 
the relationship between adversaries, separates out interests and needs, and allows 
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each party the opportunity to articulate those subjective fears that may impact on the 
conflict, thus opening the door to more direct negotiation between the parties. 
III 
Perhaps the best-known case of consultation in the IsraellPalestine conflict is that of 
the Oslo Accords, or Declaration of Principles of 1993. In order to analyse the 
effectiveness of the consultation approach in this particular conflict, and the 
effectiveness of this approach in dealing with the specific issues of this conflict, it is, 
perhaps best to begin by detailing the process by which the Declaration of Principles 
was reached. 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the unchallenged hegemony of the United 
States in the Middle East following the 1991 Gulf War, the greatest source of 
potential instability in the region was the Arab-Israeli conflict. Further, the politically 
weakened and diplomatically isolated position of the PLO following its support of 
Iraq in the Gulf War, together with the growing strength ofIslamist movements in the 
region, made negotiations between Israel and the PLO possible (Beinin: 
http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032699.html). 
Beinin (http://www.merip.org/mero/mero032699.html) argues that the Oslo 
Declaration of Principles was not a peace treaty between Israel and the PLO, but 
rather a negotiation process without a defined outcome. During the five-year interim 
period in which negotiations were to continue, Israel was to withdraw from Gaza and 
Jericho first, and then from unspecified parts of the West Bank. In return, the PLO not 
only pledged to recognise Israel, but also to cooperate in suppressing terrorism. 
Both Israeli government actors and PLO leaders were looking for the possibility of 
opening a back channel in order to conduct negotiations more efficiently. To this end, 
TeIje Larsen, the Director of the Norwegian Labour Union 's applied social research 
institute and Jan Egeland, Norwegian Deputy Foreign Minister, offered to facilitate a 
secret back channel in Norway between Israel and the PLO (Dale: 
http ://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/3/p2S.html). 
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At the initiative of Yossi Beilin, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister, talks were initiated 
between Yair Hirschfeld, a social scientist of the Israeli NGO Economic Cooperation 
Foundation, and Abu Ala, the PLO's Minister of Finance, at an economic cooperation 
conference in London in December 1992. There it was decided that, should the two 
groups wish to continue talks, they would be organised by Larsen's research institute 
and the Norwegian Foreign Ministry under conditions of absolute secrecy in Norway 
(Dale: http://ccrweb.ccLuct.ac.zaltwo/3/p2S .html). 
The key facilitators of the Oslo Channel were Larsen, Egeland and Norwegian 
diplomat, Mona Juul. Their approach was based on a model of maximising flexibility 
through governmental and non-governmental cooperation. Further, the facilitators did 
not enter into substantial discussions other than by analysing the conflict or 
recommending which parties to include. As facilitators in a problem-solving 
approach, their primary tasks were to build up confidence and credibility between the 
parties, to contribute to a relaxed and informal atmosphere, and to act as buffers for 
the parties' emotions and frustrations (Dale: 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.zaltwo/3/p2S.html). 
The first meetings were held in January 1993, where the PLO representatives included 
Abu Ala, PLO political advisor, Hassan Asfour, and economist Maher al Kurd. 
Hirschfeld and his academic colleague and former student, Ron Pundak, represented 
Israel in these preliminary negotiations. Although Abu Ala initially insisted on 
meeting with official negotiators, he accepted temporary assurances that the Israeli 
academics could be seen as Beilin's envoys (Dale: 
http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.zaltwo/3/p2S.html). 
The first meeting was an eight-hour brainstorming sesSIOn devoted to exploring 
possibilities for dialogue. In accordance with the theory of problem-solving, the 
discussions did not focus on resolution of the conflict, but rather on whether it was 
possible to find common ground from which the two parties could work. 
Three weeks after the first meeting, the participants reconvened in Norway. At this 
meeting, the idea of a Joint Declaration of Principles allowing for Israeli withdrawal 
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and gradual Palestinian autonomy was presented and adopted as the main substance 
for the negotiations. Participants agreed to deal with the least problematic issues first, 
and gradually tackle the more intractable issues. The result of the adoption of this 
graduality principle meant that the most difficult questions were only dealt with to the 
extent that they were put on the agenda for future negotiations. In the five subsequent 
meetings, participants spent time getting to know each other, sounding out different 
attitudes and view points, breaking down barriers and enemy images, and seeing the 
problem from the other side's point of Vlew. According to Dale 
(http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.zaltwo/3/p25 .html), the participants 
learned to know each other not only as negotiating partners but also as fellow 
human beings with similar concerns ". The successful establishment of personal 
and valued relationships between the participants in this pre-negotiations phase 
was crucial for the later dynamics of the process. 
The Palestinian representatives did, however, threaten to discontinue negotiations 
unless Israel sent official state representatives. On condition that the talks remained 
secret, the Israeli government sent Uri Savir, the Director General of the Foreign 
Ministry, and Yoel Singer, a legal expert, and Hirschfeld and Pundak were urged to 
stay on in order to share their experiences with the others, and to preserve the 
informal atmosphere 0 fthe talks. 
By the end of August 1993, the negotiated agreements were published, to be signed 
by Arafat and Rabin, and officially sanctioned by the United States of America in 
Washington on the 13th of September. The first steps in the process were interim 
negotiations, resulting in Israel's withdrawal from Jericho and Gaza, the nomination 
of the Palestinian National Authority (PNA), and the beginning of a five-year 
transitional period of Palestinian self-rule under the PNA. Further, Oslo was followed 
by Oslo II, an Interim Agreement in September of 1995, aimed at expanding 
Palestinian self-rule by withdrawing Israeli forces from six large cities in the occupied 
West Bank. Finally, the permanent status of negotiations commenced in May 1996 
(Dale: http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za!two/3/p25.html). 
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IV 
The IsraeVPalestine conflict may be considered on two levels. If one considers the 
PLO and Israel as representatives of the Palestinian and Israeli sides of the conflict, 
then the conflict may be termed to have reached, or at least been de-escalated to stage 
three of the conflict escalation model. The PLO and Israel both display attitudes of 
distrust towards each other and are concerned with fundamental needs such as 
security and identity. 
In contrast, when one considers the conflict as one between Islarnism and Israel, the 
conflict seems more typical of a fourth-stage conflict. No direct communication exists 
between Islarnist movements and Israel, and these antagonists portray each other in 
non-human terms, thereby legitimising violence against the other. The conflict is 
perceived in terms of ultimate survival, where the recognition and survival of one 
party is perceived to limit the survival of the other, and this has led to a situation 
where each party attempts the outright destruction of the other. 
In either case, the consultation approach to negotiation is vital in order to attempt a 
de-escalation of the conflict to a point where other means of negotiation may deal 
with the substantive issues of the conflict. 
Dale (http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.za/two/3/p2S.html) argues that two lessons may be 
learned from the process and failed implementation of the Oslo Accords. First, the 
model of secret, informal negotiations in a workshop-like back channel strengthen 
creativity and the capacity for problem-solving where more traditional approaches are 
less flexible in this regard. The Oslo process provided the opportunity for mutual 
recognition between the PLO and the Israeli government and broke down barriers 
between the parties that previously seemed insurmountable. 
As a process of consultation, the Oslo Accords were successful in achieving mutual 
recognition between Israel and the PLO, and bringing them together in an 
environment where they could break down stereotypes and gain insights into the fears 
and concerns of each other's position. The problem-solving nature of the process 
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allowed for face-to-face interaction between representatives of the two groups, and 
allowed for each to articulate fears, and offer solutions that would be responsive to 
both sides needs and fears. 
As a process of consultation, the Oslo Accords failed to meet certain requirements 
that are necessary for successful consultation outcomes. In limiting the process to the 
PLO and the Israeli government, the Declaration of Principles failed to stabilise the 
relationship between the various parties to the conflict, as it did not identify the key 
elements and issues at stake. 
Dale's second point (http://ccrweb.ccr.uct.ac.zaltwo/3/p25.html) is that, although the 
staged approach to peace created strong and potentially fruitful relationships between 
the participants, the exclusivity of the approach produced a problematic re-entry 
problem through the exclusion of important groups in the process. 
As a consultation process, the Oslo process focussed mainly on substantive concerns 
in the conflict, without giving enough credence to the importance of Islamic identity 
in Palestine. The Oslo process was primarily concerned with economic development, 
and thus with the satisfaction of physiological needs for survival. As was noted 
earlier, consultation needs to focus on discussions of collectivities, as needs are 
pursued through collective entities, especially through identity groups. As such, the 
emphasis on objective issues in the Oslo process rather than an increased emphasis on 
important substantive issues - like those of Palestinian Islamic identity - made the 
Declaration of Principles more difficult to introduce into Palestinian society. 
Furthermore, consultation is most effective when practiced in conjunction with, or as 
a precursor to, other methods of conflict resolution. The Oslo process failed to deal 
with subjective issues like Islamic identity in Palestine, and consequent attempts at 
mediation proved unsuccessful as the initial problem-solving process failed to attain 
sufficient support due to its failure to include a recognition of the Islamic essence of 
both the conflict and of Palestinian national identity. 
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v 
While secular nationalism previously existed as a primary mobilising identity group in 
Palestine, the rise of Islamist movements and their increased popularity has pointed to 
the fact that Palestinians no longer see themselves as nationalists only; the advent of 
ethno-ideological religious nationalism has resulted in a merging of Islamic and 
nationalist identities within the Palestinian population. Organisations like Hamas have 
received growing credibility and legitimacy with the declining support of the PLO, 
yet, despite their growing popularity, they have been sidelined in negotiation 
processes. It is not enough to assume, as was assumed by the Oslo participants and 
facilitators, that Islamist movements will readily agree to negotiation outcomes when 
they have not been included in the initial negotiation rounds. More importantly, it is 
not enough to assume that Palestinians will readily agree to negotiation outcomes that 
sideline a recognition ofthe identity of the group that they mobilise around. 
While prevIOUS negotiation attempts to resolve the IsraelfPalestine conflict have 
focussed primarily on Israel and the PLO as those parties most immediately involved 
in the conflict, these attempts have failed to incorporate other important aspects of 
shifting identities. Islamist movements, and the sentiments that they express, have 
largely been ignored. Even needs-based negotiation processes like the Oslo Accords, 
have failed to take cognisance of Islam as an important aspect of Palestinian national 
identity. In order to ensure the viability of future negotiation processes, and in order to 
satisfy as fully as possible those needs that are vital to individuals and collectivities, it 
is necessary to provide recognition of the importance of religious identity in both the 
Israeli and Palestinian populations. 
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Conclusion 
Religious conflicts are generally more resistant to traditional techniques of diplomatic 
or political mediation and negotiation than substantive conflicts of interest. Kelman 
(1 990: 285) argues that an emphasis on subjective social processes, or a needs 
perspective to conflict, focuses attention on a set of collective psychological needs, 
including needs for identity, security and recognition, where a failure to fulfil these 
needs contributes to the causes, escalation and perpetuation of conflict. Furthermore, 
the profound resistance to change - despite changing realities and interests - that 
characterises intense, protracted conflicts is typically rooted in the impact of such 
needs and associated fears on the perceptions and beliefs of the parties (Kelman: 
1990: 284). 
While real differences in interests may cause intergoup conflict, due to the fact that 
conflict is at least partly, and at times, predominantly a subjective social process, once 
a conflict is initiated, 
the perceptions, attitudes and interaction of the parties become crucial elements 
in determining its further course (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 32). 
The popularity of third party intervention in situations of protracted conflict demands 
that the understanding and skills of theorists of conflict resolution be increased in 
order to completely understand the objective and subjective mix that underlies most 
conflicts (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 42). To this end, a synthesis of the consultation 
model of negotiation and more traditional approaches of mediation and conciliation is 
valuable. Rather than seeing these methods as competitive or contradictory, a 
recognition of the complemetarity of the approaches 
provides a useful point of departure for further understanding pacific third party 
intervention and for ultimately increasing its efficacy in dealing with protracted 
social conflict (Fisher and Keashly: 1991 : 42). 
Third party intervention in conflicts may be impotent due to the lack of matching and 
sequencing of third party interventions. If power mediation is relied on in the early 
stages of the conflict without complementing this with consultation, the suppression 
of basic issues and the escalation of the conflict may manifest (Fisher & Keashly: 
1991: 41). Further, the use of consultation in early conflict stages may successfully 
contain hostility between parties and settle some of the substantive issues in order to 
65 
improve the basic relationship between the parties, thus opening the way for the 
settlement of more deep-seated substantive issues. 
In later conflict stages, the need to utilise the complementary approaches of 
consultation and mediation is necessary in order to de-escalate the conflict so that 
substantive issues may be dealt with, and the relationship between the parties can be 
improved, and thus the process can return to a substantive focus (Fisher & Keashly: 
1991: 41). 
Consultation should thus not be viewed as a substitute for other forms of negotiation, 
but rather, as a means of de-escalating conflict by improving relationships and 
communication between parties, and highlighting key issues, like identity and 
security, thus establishing an appropriate framework for continued settlement of 
substantive issues. 
That being said, the concluding chapter of this thesis proposes to consider a more 
holistic approach to resolution in the IsraeVPalestine case. Furthermore, objections to 
the emphasis placed on the consultation process will be dealt with in the second 
section. The final section will consider the importance of reconceptualising conflict 
resolution by considering the complementarity of consultation and traditional 
negotiation methods. This reconceptualisation ensures that both subjective and 
substantive issues are dealt with in conflict resolution, and issues like identity thus 
receive the recognition that they deserve in negotiation, as sources of protracted social 
conflict. 
I 
The IsraeVPalestine conflict is perceived by both parties to be a zero-sum conflict 
over territory and the survival of an identity group. Kelman (1990: 290) thus argues 
that, while the focus of resolution remains on territory, the conflict will remain 
defined in zero-sum terms. The conflict can, however, be defined in existential terms, 
in terms of identity and security of existence. While this tends to be perceived in zero-
sum terms by the parties, Kelman (1990: 290) argues that a focus on identity and 
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security may provide the key for achieving conflict resolution. While the territorial 
issue is, indeed, a zero-sum conflict that may only be solved through compromise, 
defining the conflict in existential terms provides the possibility of a positive-sum 
outcome. As noted by Burton (1988: 198), 
conflicts over material interests tend to lead to win-lose outcomes in which the 
gain of the one is the loss of the other, whereas conflicts over human needs have 
possible win-win outcomes. This is because basic needs, such as identity, 
security, recognition, justice, and political participation, can be met without 
depriving others. In fact, in most cases, the supply of the resource increases 
because of reciprocal behaviour. 
Thus Kelman (1990: 291) argues that if Israelis can be assured that Palestinian self-
determination can be achieved without a threat to Israeli security, and if Palestinians 
can be assured that Israeli security concerns can be accommodated without denying 
political expression to Palestinian identity, an attempt at an historic compromise over 
land and resources may be undertaken. 
Important for third party intervention III the case of IsraellPalestine, then, is an 
emphasis on the subjective issues at play in the conflict. Of particular interest to this 
thesis is an emphasis on the Islamic identity of the people of Palestine and the impact 
that this has had on both the conflict itself and on settlement thereof. 
The exclusion of Islamic identity in the negotiation process has largely occurred as a 
reaction to the extreme actions of militant Islamist movements like Hamas. Because 
acts of violence by members of one community against another generate a counter-
rection, these actions produce hatred that may undermine the possibility of lasting co-
existence between the two communities (Halliday: 2000: 81). However, Halliday 
(2000: 36, 86), however, argues that, while groups like Hamas attempt to achieve their 
goals through morally reprehensible means, 
the crucial moral guideline is that when a group commits acts that could be 
regarded as terrorism, these must be separated from our judgement of the justice 
of its cause. 
In line with this, it is important to ensure that identity groups that have such political 
support, despite the tactics of militants, are represented at the negotiation level. For 
this reason, the participants in the consultation sessions playa great role in ensuring 
that decisions and attitudinal changes reached in the process are transferred back into 
society. As such, Fisher and Keashly (199\: 32) note that participants in consultation 
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sessIOns may range from interested and representative members of the respective 
groups to the conflict, to appointed but informal influentials who have a direct input 
into decision-making. The identity of the participants is, however, significant, "since 
it relates directly to the difficult question of transfer of outcomes back to the actual 
relationship between the parties" (Fisher & Keashly: 1991: 32). 
As issues of Islamic identity have been sidelined in the IsraellPalestine negotiation 
process, the PLO has been unable to transfer the changed perceptions, attitudes and 
negative stereotypes back into Palestinian society. At issue, then, is the fact that 
Islamic representatives, either from Islamist movements or as independents, should be 
included in consultation processes in future negotiating structures in order to ensure 
that the identity needs of the Palestinian people are articulated and recognised by 
other parties to the conflict. 
In order to have more hope of success in the resolution of the IsraellPalestine conflict, 
conflict resolution strategies need to include a greater analysis of the sUbjective issues 
underpinning the conflict. As such, the synthesis of problem-solving and more 
traditional conflict resolution methods provides the opportunity for a more holistic 
approach to the analysis of the conflict, where both substantive issues and subjective 
identity needs are considered integral to any attempt at resolution. Most importantly, 
though, the inclusion of the Islamic sentiment is of crucial importance, as the 
Islamisation of the conflict and of Palestinian identity has brought the Islamic identity 
to the fore in public consciousness. 
II 
The emphasis that this thesis has placed on the consultation process of negotiation is 
not without its problems. 
One ofthe central difficulties in including an Islamist voice in the negotiation process 
is that organisations like Hamas are generally characterised by a disavowal to 
negotiate with Israel. How, then, does one ensure that the Islamic identity will receive 
due recognition in a process of consultation and negotiation? 
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The first counter to this argument is that, due to its merging of Palestinian nationalism 
with Islam, Hamas has accrued a relatively significant percentage of moderate 
support, and in order to ensure its political survival, this organisation needs to 
maintain political support in the region. 
In terms of this, then, Keppel (2002: 328) argues that, since the Oslo process, Hamas 
has had to reconcile its maximalist position - calling for the liberation of all of 
Palestine and the installation of an Islamic state - with "the everyday aspirations of 
ordinary people, who wished to be rid of the Israeli occupiers as quickly as possible." 
As a movement that enjoys both radical and moderate support, Hamas has had to 
reformulate its position since Oslo in order to maximise its social support base. Thus, 
while some supporters view participation in the PNA as lending the Accord a 
credibility that it does not have, others argue that if Hamas were to participate, then it 
would form the strongest opposition party in the territory (Usher: 1996: 346). 
The mix of social conservatism and radical nationalism evident in the Hamas support 
base thus proves a dilemma for the organisation. While pragmatic Palestinians are 
prepared to put the long-term goal of complete liberation on hold in return for 
autonomy of some sort, radical Islamists foreswear any sort of negotiation with Israel. 
Usher argues that one solution to the dilemma that Hamas faces - one that is under 
intense discussion in Islamist circles - is to form an Islamist political party for the 
changed circumstances of autonomy. As one Hamas leader, Isma'il Haniyya argues, 
"a political party is crucial for dealing with the new situation" (in Usher: 1991: 350). 
If Hamas decides to pursue this course of action in order to ensure its political 
survival, it becomes better placed to represent Islamic needs in future negotiation 
processes. 
If, however, Hamas continues to refuse negotiation with the Israeli govermnent, 
another possible means of ensuring an inclusion of the Islamic voice in negotiation 
processes is to sideline militant organisations like Hamas in favour of influential 
Islamic leaders in Palestine. As was noted earlier, the identity of participants in 
consultation processes is vitally important for transferring outcomes back into society. 
If one considers the importance of ensuring the articulation of Islamic Palestinian 
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identity needs in consultation, then an inclusion of Muslim theologians in the process 
may fulfil the identity needs of moderate Islamic Palestinians, and thus make the 
recourse to violent action less socially acceptable. 
One of the central problems with the problem-solving approach is ensuring that the 
changed attitudes and perceptions of parties to the consultation process may be 
transferred back into society. This problem of re-entry is determined by the fact that 
deeply ingrained political belief systems are extremely resistant to attempts to 
change them by political leaders, especially if they are reinforced by an intense 
victimhood psychology (Montville: 1993: 123). 
Adams (in Montville: 1993 : 123) suggests that, in the study of mass communication, 
the media is most likely to strengthen already held views rather than change them. In 
particular, when it becomes a question of public attitudes towards distrusted or 
disliked groups, sociological factors (social networks, value systems and influential 
leaders) and psychological factors (family, peer and ethnic biases) act as barriers to 
the receipt of alternative information relating to opposing groups (Montville: 1993: 
123). 
However, according to Montville (1993: 123), even these barriers may be vulnerable 
if the dissonant, 'good' news, conveyed by mass media, comes from a credible 
source; and is repeated with variation, is disseminated via multimedia, reinforced 
by personal contact, and presented in balanced, 'two-sided' accounts. 
Thus Rogers (in Montville: 1993: 124) argues that the altering of attitudes and beliefs 
depends on interpersonal communication networks. Where respected opinion leaders 
and their peers accept the new information as valid and change their attitudes 
correspondingly, the diffusion rate of that idea has great effect in changing public 
perceptions and beliefsll. 
Finally, this thesis may be charged with ignoring the intractable substantive issues that 
underscore the IsraeVPalestine conflict - issues that include the future status of 
Jerusalem, the problem that the Jewish settlers pose to Palestinian autonomy, and, 
indeed, the issue of how the territory should be divided. 
II For more information on the dissemination of information contrary to current attitudes and beliefs, 
refer to Rogers, E. "Diffusion of the idea of Beyond War" in Gromyko, A. and Hellman, M. (eds) 
Breakthrough: Emerging New Thinking. 1988. Walker: Ncw York. 
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This thesis does not attempt to make prescriptive statements about the resolution of 
substantive issues of this particular conflict, but rather considers how the parties to the 
conflict may reach a point where these issues may be addressed without being 
impacted on negatively by the destructive perceptions that sUbjective attitudes 
engender. Important to this thesis, then, is the notion that substantive issues may only 
be resolved once the parties to a conflict are prepared to accept and recognise each 
other. The process of consultation, then, provides a means of breaking down 
destructive stereotyping, addressing the important notions of needs such as identity 
and security and facilitating the communication process. In this way, consultation 
aims to improve the relationship between the parties in order to improve the chances 
of success in making the compromises that mediation and conciliation require. 
III 
This thesis has sketched out the importance of human needs as they pertain to conflict. 
Inherent needs for survival, recognition and identity may serve to drive conflict and, 
as such, they need to be taken into account in any attempt at resolution of protracted 
conflicts like that ofIsrael and Palestine. 
Further, it was detennined that identity as a human need plays a central role in 
conflict situations by virtue of the fact that the human need to belong to identity 
groups is, in itself, inherently competitive and conflict-creating. In addition, the 
salience of national and religious identity groups is of great import in the context of 
conflict, where group allegiance is stronger and greater discrimination against other 
national or religious groups may result, particularly where a specific identity is 
perceived to be under threat. 
The religious identity group holds particular importance in the analysis of conflict, as 
violent actions against the enemy are given moral authority and lent legitimacy due to 
the religious sanction of violence. As such, in any analysis of protracted religious or 
identity conflict, it is necessary to include an analysis of the impact of human needs 
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deprivation on the parties' perceptions of the conflict and the adversary, and thus on 
the escalation of the conflict. 
Rather than considering conflict resolution methods as isolated and conflicting, then, 
it is important to recognise that these methods may complement each other and, in 
considering both the objective and SUbjective elements inherent in conflict situations, 
may make for a more holistic approach to both the evaluation and analysis of conflict, 
and the resolution thereof. 
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